Prof. Dr. Roland Strausz
Profil
Forschungsthemen11
Data Privacy in Digital Markets (PRIVDIMA)
Quelle ↗Förderer: Horizon Europe: ERC Advanced Grant Zeitraum: 10/2023 - 09/2028 Projektleitung: Prof. Dr. Roland Strausz
GRK 1659/1: Interdependenzen in der Steuerung von Marktprozessen
Quelle ↗Förderer: DFG Graduiertenkolleg Zeitraum: 10/2011 - 12/2016 Projektleitung: Prof. Dr. Roland Strausz
Leibniz-Wissenschaftscampus: Berlin Center for Consumer Policy
Quelle ↗Förderer: Leibniz-Gemeinschaft Zeitraum: 09/2015 - 10/2019 Projektleitung: Prof. Dr. Roland Strausz
Leibniz-WissenschaftsCampus "Berlin Centre for Consumer Policies" (BCCP) – 2. Förderphase
Quelle ↗Förderer: Leibniz-Gemeinschaft Zeitraum: 10/2019 - 09/2025 Projektleitung: Prof. Dr. Roland Strausz
Market Power in Vertically Related Markets
Quelle ↗Förderer: DFG Sachbeihilfe Zeitraum: 01/2009 - 12/2011 Projektleitung: Prof. Dr. Roland Strausz
Ökonomie des Klimawandels - Verbundvorhaben: Klimapolitik in einer zögerlichen Welt - von zweitbesten Ansätzen zu globaler Kooperation
Quelle ↗Förderer: Bundesministerium für Forschung, Technologie und Raumfahrt Zeitraum: 09/2011 - 02/2015 Projektleitung: Prof. Dr. Roland Strausz
SFB 649/2: Regulatory Risk (TP A 08)
Quelle ↗Förderer: DFG Sonderforschungsbereich Zeitraum: 01/2009 - 12/2016 Projektleitung: Prof. Dr. Roland Strausz
SFB/TR 15/1-3: Auktionen, Anreizprobleme und Wettbewerb (TP A 07)
Quelle ↗Förderer: DFG Sonderforschungsbereich Zeitraum: 01/2004 - 12/2015 Projektleitung: Prof. Dr. Roland Strausz
SFB/TRR 190/1: Optimale dynamische Verträge (TP B02)
Quelle ↗Förderer: DFG Sonderforschungsbereich Zeitraum: 01/2017 - 12/2020 Projektleitung: Prof. Dr. Roland Strausz, Prof. Dr. Ulrich Horst
SFB/TRR 190/2: Optimale dynamische Vertragsgestaltung, Vertragsdurchsetzung und Ambiguität (TP B02)
Quelle ↗Förderer: DFG Sonderforschungsbereich Zeitraum: 01/2021 - 12/2024 Projektleitung: Prof. Dr. Ulrich Horst, Prof. Dr. Roland Strausz
SFB/TRR 190/3: Optimale dynamische Vertragsgestaltung, Vertragsdurchsetzung und Ambiguität (TP B02)
Quelle ↗Förderer: DFG Sonderforschungsbereich Zeitraum: 01/2025 - 12/2028 Projektleitung: Prof. Dr. Ulrich Horst, Prof. Dr. Roland Strausz
Mögliche Industrie-Partner10
Stand: 26.4.2026, 19:48:44 (Top-K=20, Min-Cosine=0.4)
- 22 Treffer60.5%
- Gamification for Climate ActionP60.5%
- Gamification for Climate Action
- 27 Treffer58.3%
- Design & Implementierung eines neuronalen Netzwerks für die Personendetektion (Transferbonus)P58.3%
- Design & Implementierung eines neuronalen Netzwerks für die Personendetektion (Transferbonus)
- 52 Treffer57.1%
- Workshop Reliable Methods and Mathematical ModelingP57.1%
- Workshop Reliable Methods and Mathematical Modeling
- 21 Treffer56.5%
- Embodied Audition for RobotSP56.5%
- Embodied Audition for RobotS
- 9 Treffer56.4%
- Digitalising Mobility and International Networks With Open Education (DIONE)P56.4%
- Digitalising Mobility and International Networks With Open Education (DIONE)
- 22 Treffer56.0%
- INTeractive RObotics Research NetworkP56.0%
- INTeractive RObotics Research Network
- 24 Treffer56.0%
- INTeractive RObotics Research NetworkP56.0%
- INTeractive RObotics Research Network
- 67 Treffer55.5%
- WATSON - A holistic frameWork with Anticounterfeit and inTelligence-based technologieS that will assist food chain stakehOlders in rapidly identifying and preveNting the spread of fraudulent practicesP55.5%
- WATSON - A holistic frameWork with Anticounterfeit and inTelligence-based technologieS that will assist food chain stakehOlders in rapidly identifying and preveNting the spread of fraudulent practices
- 68 Treffer55.5%
- WATSON - A holistic frameWork with Anticounterfeit and inTelligence-based technologieS that will assist food chain stakehOlders in rapidly identifying and preveNting the spread of fraudulent practicesP55.5%
- EU: HIgh ACCuracy printed electronics to <1μm, for OLAE TFT and Display Applications (HI-ACCURACY)P42.0%
- WATSON - A holistic frameWork with Anticounterfeit and inTelligence-based technologieS that will assist food chain stakehOlders in rapidly identifying and preveNting the spread of fraudulent practices
- WATSON - A holistic frameWork with Anticounterfeit and inTelligence-based technologieS that will assist food chain stakehOlders in rapidly identifying and preveNting the spread of fraudulent practicesP55.5%
- WATSON - A holistic frameWork with Anticounterfeit and inTelligence-based technologieS that will assist food chain stakehOlders in rapidly identifying and preveNting the spread of fraudulent practices
Publikationen25
Top 25 nach Zitationen — Quelle: OpenAlex (BAAI/bge-m3 embedded für Matching).
394 Zitationen · DOI
Abstract What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? This book addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. This book provides explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. It also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area.
American Economic Review · 364 Zitationen · DOI
Crowdfunding provides innovation in enabling entrepreneurs to contract with consumers before investment. Under aggregate demand uncertainty, this improves screening for valuable projects. Entrepreneurial moral hazard and private cost information threatens this benefit. Crowdfunding's after-markets enable consumers to actively implement deferred payments and thereby manage moral hazard. Popular crowdfunding platforms offer schemes that allow consumers to do so through conditional pledging behavior. Efficiency is sustainable only if expected returns exceed an agency cost associated with the entrepreneurial incentive problems. By reducing demand uncertainty, crowdfunding promotes welfare and complements traditional entrepreneurial financing, which focuses on controlling moral hazard. (JEL D21, D81, D82, D86, G32, L26)
Econometrica · 256 Zitationen · DOI
This paper extends the revelation principle to environments in which the mechanism designer cannot fully commit to the outcome induced by the mechanism. We show that he may optimally use a direct mechanism under which truthful revelation is an optimal strategy for the agent. In contrast with the conventional revelation principle, however, the agent may not use this strategy with probability one. Our results apply to contracting problems between a principal and a single agent. By reducing such problems to well-defined programming problems they provide a basic tool for studying imperfect commitment.
The Review of Economic Studies · 168 Zitationen · DOI
This paper studies a principal-agent relationship in which either the principal or a supervisor can monitor the agent's hidden action by the use of identical monitoring technologies. We assume that signals are private information and commitment to monitoring is not possible. We show that delegation of monitoring is profitable. With delegation the principal can better regulate incentives (incentive-effect) and commit to a broader range of wage structures (commitment-effect). We introduce collusion to find an endogenous bound on rewards and show that collusion limits the commitment-effect, but due to the incentive-effect delegation remains profitable.
International Journal of Industrial Organization · 122 Zitationen · DOI
The Review of Economic Studies · 104 Zitationen · DOI
We introduce ex post participation constraints in the standard sequential screening model. This captures the presence of consumer withdrawal rights as, for instance, mandated by European Union regulation of “distance sales contracts”. With such additional constraints, the optimal contract is static and, unlike with only ex ante participation constraints, does not elicit the agent's information sequentially. This holds whenever differences in ex ante and ex post outside options are below a positive upper bound. Welfare effects of mandatory withdrawal rights are ambiguous. Since it is insufficient in our setting to consider only local incentive constraints, we develop a novel technique to identify the relevant global constraints.
Journal of Economic Theory · 78 Zitationen · DOI
The Review of Economic Studies · 75 Zitationen · DOI
The paper studies procurement contracts with pre-project investigations in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard. To model the procurer's problem, we extend a standard sequential screening model to endogenous information acquisition with moral hazard. The optimal contract displays systematic distortions in information acquisition. Due to a rent effect, adverse selection induces too much information acquisition to prevent cost overruns and too little information acquisition to prevent false project cancellations. Moral hazard mitigates the distortions related to cost overruns yet exacerbates those related to false negatives. The optimal mechanism is a menu of option contracts that achieves the dual goal of providing incentives for information acquisition and truthful information revelation.
Econstor (Econstor) · 70 Zitationen · DOI
The paper provides a tractable, analytical framework to study regulatory risk under optimal incentive regulation. Regulatory risk is captured by uncertainty about the policy variables in the regulator’s objective function: weights attached to profits and costs of public funds. Results are as follows: 1) The regulator’s reaction to regulatory risk depends on the curvature of the aggregate demand function. 2) It yields a positive information rent effect exactly when demand is convex. 3) Firms benefit from regulatory risk exactly when demand is convex. 4) Consumers’ risk preferences tend to contradict the firm’s. 5) Benevolent regulators always prefer regulatory risk and these preferences may contradict both the firm’s and consumers’ preferences.
Scandinavian Journal of Economics · 68 Zitationen · DOI
We describe a principal–supervisor–agent relationship in which agent and supervisor may collude. To prevent collusion, the principal may contract on a noisy signal which is correlated with the occurrence of collusion. When the signal is informative enough, the principal uses it and no collusion occurs in equilibrium. These contracts, however, are ex post inefficient and are only optimal if the principal can commit not to renegotiate. With renegotiation it is never optimal for the principal to prevent collusion and, at the same time, condition contracts on the signal. In fact, when the signal is informative enough collusion occurs in equilibrium.
International Tax and Public Finance · 67 Zitationen · DOI
Journal of Economic Theory · 67 Zitationen · DOI
Journal of Economic Theory · 66 Zitationen · DOI
Econstor (Econstor) · 53 Zitationen · DOI
I investigate the argument that, in a two–party system with different regulatory objectives, political uncertainty generates regulatory risk. I show that this risk has a fluctuation effect that hurts both parties and an output–expansion effect that benefits one party. Consequently, at least one party dislikes regulatory risk. Moreover, both political parties gain from eliminating regulatory risk when political divergence is small or the winning probability of the regulatory–risk–averse party is not too large. Because of a commitment problem, direct political bargaining is insufficient to eliminate regulatory risk. Politically independent regulatory agencies solve this commitment problem.
Economics Letters · 47 Zitationen · DOI
The Accounting Review · 44 Zitationen · DOI
ABSTRACT: We develop a model to show that transparent accounting can worsen the asset substitution effect of debt. This negative effect can outweigh the usual positive effect of transparency. We demonstrate this point by comparing pure historical cost accounting to the conservatively skewed accounting regime of lower-of-cost-or-market (LCM). In a market with asymmetric information, the two regimes lead to different degrees of transparency. The more transparent LCM regime produces more efficient results for firms with lower debt levels, while the opaque rule of pure historical cost accounting is preferable for higher debt levels. We explore the implications of this result for the firm's optimal capital structure.
Econstor (Econstor) · 40 Zitationen · DOI
In markets with quality unobservable to buyers, third-party certification is often the only instrument to increase transparency. While both sellers and buyers have a demand for certification, its role differs fundamentally: sellers use it for signaling, buyers use it for inspection. Seller induced certification leads to more transparency, because it is informative - even if unused. By contrast, buyer induced certification incentivizes certifiers to limit transparency, as this raises demand for inspection. Whenever transparency is socially beneficial, seller certification is preferable. It also yields certifiers larger profits, so that regulating the mode of certification is redundant.
Economics Letters · 36 Zitationen · DOI
The Economic Journal · 26 Zitationen · DOI
Stressing the multi-dimensional character of quality, I propose a new theory of planned obsolescence as an incentive device that benefits consumers. I argue that planned obsolescence increases the frequency of repurchases and, therefore, enables consumers to punish producers faster for a lack of overall quality. This strengthens the producers' incentives to provide adequate levels of quality. The theory implies a trade-off between a good's durability and its other unobservable quality attributes. This leads to an artificially high degree of obsolescence as compared to the first best where quality is observable. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009.
The B E Journal of Theoretical Economics · 24 Zitationen · DOI
This paper investigates how additional ex post private information by the agent affects the equilibrium outcome of the monopolistic screening model. In general, the principal always weakly benefits when the agent receives additional private information after the contracting stage. Instead, both the agent's equilibrium payoffs and allocative efficiency may, due to the principal's concerns about information rents, increase or decrease. Moreover, we obtain the result that optimal contracts may involve lying offtheequilibrium path and show that this exacerbates bunching in the monopolistic screening problem.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · 24 Zitationen · DOI
The Review of Economic Studies · 19 Zitationen · DOI
In markets with quality unobservable to buyers, third-party certification is often the only instrument to increase transparency. While both sellers and buyers have a demand for certification, its role differs fundamentally: sellers use it for signalling, buyers use it for inspection. Seller-induced certification leads to more transparency, because it is informative—even if unused. By contrast, buyer-induced certification incentivizes certifiers to limit transparency, as this raises demand for inspection. Whenever transparency is socially beneficial, seller certification is preferable. It also yields certifiers larger profits, so that regulating the mode of certification is redundant.
Environmental and Resource Economics · 18 Zitationen · DOI
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · 18 Zitationen · DOI
We study how long‐term contracts condition on a natural flow of information that reduces asymmetric information over time. If such interim information is verifiable, optimal contracts achieve the first best. Under nonverifiability, the optimal contract depends on the signal's accuracy and timing. Introducing signal manipulation as a parameterization of verifiability reveals a trade‐off between accuracy and manipulability. Signals that are accurate, received early, or hard to manipulate enable the principal to extract all rents and adjust allocations closer to the first best. Imprecise, late, and manipulable signals affect only future allocations and leave rents to efficient types.
The Economic Journal · 17 Zitationen · DOI
I develop a tractable framework to study regulatory risk under optimal monopoly regulation. It captures increasing regulatory risk as mean‐preserving spreads of two regulatory variables: weights attached to profits and costs of public funds. The regulator’s reaction to regulatory risk depends on the curvature of demand. For convex (concave) demand, it yields a positive (negative) information rent effect that benefits (hurts) the firm. Consumers dislike a positive information rent effect but their risk preferences also depend on their tendency to dislike fluctuations in consumption. Risk preference of benevolent regulators may contradict both those of the firm and consumers.
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SFB/TRR 190/2: Optimale dynamische Vertragsgestaltung, Vertragsdurchsetzung und Ambiguität (TP B02)
university
Stammdaten
Identität, Organisation und Kontakt aus HU-FIS.
- Name
- Prof. Dr. Roland Strausz
- Titel
- Prof. Dr.
- Fakultät
- Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
- Institut
- Wirtschaftstheorie I
- Telefon
- +49 30 2093-99452
- HU-FIS-Profil
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- Zuletzt gescrapt
- 26.4.2026, 01:12:53