Prof. Dr. Roland Strausz

Profil

Zusammenfassung

Roland Strausz ist Experte für Mechanismusdesign und Vertragstheorie mit Fokus auf optimale Anreizstrukturen in asymmetrischen Informationssituationen. Seine Forschung adressiert praktische Probleme wie Auktionsdesign, Regulierung, Beschaffung und Verbraucherschutz, indem sie theoretische Lösungen für Situationen entwickelt, in denen Vertragsparteien unvollständige Informationen haben oder sich nicht vollständig an Vereinbarungen binden können.

Skills

Name

Prof. Dr. Roland Strausz

Titel

Prof. Dr.

Fakultät

Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät

Institut

Wirtschaftstheorie I

E-Mail

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HU-FIS-Profil

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Zuletzt gescrapt

27.6.2026, 01:15:11

• Data Privacy in Digital Markets (PRIVDIMA)

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  Förderer: Horizon Europe: ERC Advanced Grant Zeitraum: 10/2023 - 09/2028 Projektleitung: Prof. Dr. Roland Strausz

• GRK 1659/1: Interdependenzen in der Steuerung von Marktprozessen

  Quelle ↗

  Förderer: DFG Graduiertenkolleg Zeitraum: 10/2011 - 12/2016 Projektleitung: Prof. Dr. Roland Strausz

• Leibniz-Wissenschaftscampus: Berlin Center for Consumer Policy

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  Förderer: Leibniz-Gemeinschaft Zeitraum: 09/2015 - 10/2019 Projektleitung: Prof. Dr. Roland Strausz

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• An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design

  2015

  397 Zitationen · DOI

  Abstract What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? This book addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. This book provides explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. It also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area.

• A Theory of Crowdfunding: A Mechanism Design Approach with Demand Uncertainty and Moral Hazard

  2017

  American Economic Review · 374 Zitationen · DOI

  Crowdfunding provides innovation in enabling entrepreneurs to contract with consumers before investment. Under aggregate demand uncertainty, this improves screening for valuable projects. Entrepreneurial moral hazard and private cost information threatens this benefit. Crowdfunding's after-markets enable consumers to actively implement deferred payments and thereby manage moral hazard. Popular crowdfunding platforms offer schemes that allow consumers to do so through conditional pledging behavior. Efficiency is sustainable only if expected returns exceed an agency cost associated with the entrepreneurial incentive problems. By reducing demand uncertainty, crowdfunding promotes welfare and complements traditional entrepreneurial financing, which focuses on controlling moral hazard. (JEL D21, D81, D82, D86, G32, L26)

• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case

  2001

  Econometrica · 256 Zitationen · DOI

  This paper extends the revelation principle to environments in which the mechanism designer cannot fully commit to the outcome induced by the mechanism. We show that he may optimally use a direct mechanism under which truthful revelation is an optimal strategy for the agent. In contrast with the conventional revelation principle, however, the agent may not use this strategy with probability one. Our results apply to contracting problems between a principal and a single agent. By reducing such problems to well-defined programming problems they provide a basic tool for studying imperfect commitment.

• Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

  SFB/TRR 190/2: Optimale dynamische Vertragsgestaltung, Vertragsdurchsetzung und Ambiguität (TP B02)

  university