Prof. Dr. Roland Strausz

Prof. Dr. Roland Strausz forscht auf dem Gebiet der theoretischen Mikroökonomie mit Schwerpunkt auf Mechanismusdesign, Vertragstheorie und Regulierung. Seine Arbeit nutzt mathematische Modellierung und Optimierung, um Anreizstrukturen in komplexen Marktprozessen zu analysieren. Ein aktueller Fokus liegt auf den wirtschaftlichen Implikationen von Digitalisierung, Datenschutz und Preisdiskriminierung in digitalen Märkten. Er untersucht zudem die Rolle von Informationsasymmetrien und deren Auswirkung auf Verbraucherschutz und Marktmacht.

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• SFB/TR 15/1-3: Auktionen, Anreizprobleme und Wettbewerb (TP A 07)

  Quelle ↗

  Förderer: DFG Sonderforschungsbereich Zeitraum: 01/2004 - 12/2015 Projektleitung: Prof. Dr. Roland Strausz

• SFB 649/2: Regulatory Risk (TP A 08)

  Quelle ↗

  Förderer: DFG Sonderforschungsbereich Zeitraum: 01/2009 - 12/2016 Projektleitung: Prof. Dr. Roland Strausz

• Market Power in Vertically Related Markets

  Quelle ↗

  Förderer: DFG Sachbeihilfe Zeitraum: 01/2009 - 12/2011 Projektleitung: Prof. Dr. Roland Strausz

• An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design

  2015

  DOI

  Abstract What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? This book addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. This book provides explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. It also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area.

• A Theory of Crowdfunding: A Mechanism Design Approach with Demand Uncertainty and Moral Hazard

  2017

  American Economic Review · DOI

  Crowdfunding provides innovation in enabling entrepreneurs to contract with consumers before investment. Under aggregate demand uncertainty, this improves screening for valuable projects. Entrepreneurial moral hazard and private cost information threatens this benefit. Crowdfunding's after-markets enable consumers to actively implement deferred payments and thereby manage moral hazard. Popular crowdfunding platforms offer schemes that allow consumers to do so through conditional pledging behavior. Efficiency is sustainable only if expected returns exceed an agency cost associated with the entrepreneurial incentive problems. By reducing demand uncertainty, crowdfunding promotes welfare and complements traditional entrepreneurial financing, which focuses on controlling moral hazard. (JEL D21, D81, D82, D86, G32, L26)