Dr. Hamid Taieb
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Eine sensible Welt. Das Problem der sekundären Qualitäten in und um die Brentano Schule
Quelle ↗Förderer: DFG Nachwuchsgruppe Zeitraum: 09/2020 - 08/2026 Projektleitung: Dr. Hamid Taieb
Emmy-Noether Research Group: A Sensible World. The Problem of Secondary Qualities in and Around the School of Brentano
Quelle ↗Förderer: DFG Nachwuchsgruppe Zeitraum: 09/2023 - 02/2027 Projektleitung: Dr. Hamid Taieb, Prof. Dr. Dominik Perler, M.A. Lina Anne de Boer
NW/1: Eine sensible Welt. Das Problem der sekundären Qualitäten in und um die Brentanoschule
Quelle ↗Förderer: DFG Nachwuchsgruppe Zeitraum: 09/2020 - 08/2023 Projektleitung: Dr. Hamid Taieb
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Publikationen25
Top 25 nach Zitationen — Quelle: OpenAlex (BAAI/bge-m3 embedded für Matching).
Primary sources in phenomenology · 34 Zitationen · DOI
The Monist · 9 Zitationen · DOI
Brentano distinguishes between intentionality and reference. According to Brentano, all mental acts are intentionally directed toward something. Some mental acts also refer to something, which is the case when their object exists in reality. For Brentano, such acts, besides their intentionality, have a peculiar relation of similarity to their object. There is no mention of Brentano's distinction between intentionality and reference in the literature. Drawing on some less well known texts, this paper aims both at showing that Brentano makes such a distinction and at underscoring the philosophical significance of his position.
Quaestio · 9 Zitationen · DOI
Anton Marty (1847-1914) is known to be the most faithful pupil of Franz Brentano. As a matter of fact, most of his philosophical ideas find their source in the works of his master. Yet, the faithfulness of Marty is not constant. As the rich correspondence between the two thinkers shows, Marty elaborates an original theory of intentionality from ca. 1904 onward. This theory is based on the idea that intentionality is a process of mental assimilation (ideelle Verähnlichung), a process at the core of which lies a sui generis relation of “ideal similitude” holding between a thinking subject and its object. This study spells out the Martyian notion of mental assimilation and traces back Marty’s evolution from his earlier position (prominently described in the recently published Deskriptive Psychologie of 1893-1894) to his final view as it is found in the Untersuchungen of 1908. It turns out that besides Brentano, Husserl is a key figure in that evolution. Such a “genetic”elucidation of Marty’s last theory is required in order to reach the main goal of this paper, namely: the clarification of Marty’s degree of dependence upon Brentano with respect to the theory of intentionality. That being said, we do not merely intend to compare the mature Marty with Brentano: our “genetic” considerations will also allow us to describe the interaction between the two thinkers before 1904. Accordingly, we begin by presenting Brentano’s own position on intentionality in discussing its two currently competing readings, namely the “discontinuist” and the “continuist” one. Against a recent interpretation, we argue that Marty’s endorsement of a “discontinuist” reading is not based on a misunderstanding of Brentano’s position.
Journal of Social Ontology · 7 Zitationen · DOI
Abstract This paper discusses the thesis defended by Edith Stein that certain acts can be attributed to the State. According to Stein, the State is a social structure characterized by sovereignty. As such, it is responsible for the production, interpretation, and application of law. These tasks require the performance of acts, most of which are what Stein calls “social acts” like enactments and orders. For Stein, the acts in question are made by the organs of the State, but in the name of the State, and are thus attributed to the State via a relation of representation. In the first section, the paper presents Stein’s thesis that the sovereignty of the State entails a series of legal prerogatives, which in turn result in various social acts being ascribed to the State through its representatives. In the second section, the paper critically discusses Stein’s views, notably her theory of representation, and her account of the nature of the State, while emphasizing its most interesting aspects, namely, its fine-grained analyses of the various acts that are attributed to the State.
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie · 7 Zitationen · DOI
Abstract Some Austro-German philosophers considered thoughts to be mind-dependent entities, that is, psychic products. Yet these authors also attributed “objectivity” to thoughts: distinct thinking subjects can have mental acts with “qualitatively” the same content. Moreover, thoughts, once built, can exist beyond the life of their inventor, “embodied” in “documents”. At the beginning of the 20th century, the notion of “psychic product” was at the centre of the debates on psychologism; a hundred years later, it is rather at the margins of the history of philosophy. While Twardowski’s theory of products has been frequently studied, those of Stumpf and the late Husserl have been much less discussed. A presentation of the Austro-German debates about psychic products is all the more important since these discussions might be of direct interest for contemporary philosophy of mind and epistemology. This paper examines the Austro-German notion of psychic products in Stumpf, Twardowski, and the later Husserl.
British Journal for the History of Philosophy · 6 Zitationen · DOI
This paper examines the account of ordinary language semantics developed by Franz Brentano and his pupil Anton Marty. Long before the interest in ordinary language in the analytic tradition, Brentanian philosophers were exploring our everyday use of words, as opposed to the scientific use of language. Brentano and Marty were especially interested in the semantics of (common) names in ordinary language. They claimed that these names are vague, and that this is due to the structure of the concepts that constitute their meaning: concepts expressed by such names are themselves vague, based on typicality, and have more or less similar items within their extension. After presenting the views of Brentano and Marty, this paper compares them to later accounts of meaning and concepts, notably Wittgenstein’s theory of family resemblances and the prototype theory of concepts, and emphasizes the originality of the Brentanian position.
6 Zitationen · DOI
Primary sources in phenomenology · 5 Zitationen · DOI
4 Zitationen · DOI
In the famous Appendix to the paragraph 11 and 20 of his V th Logical Investigation, Husserl criticizes the concept of "immanent object" defended by Brentano and his pupils.Husserl holds that intentional objects, even non-existent ones, are "transcendent".Yet, long before Husserl's criticism, Brentano and his pupils, in their theories of intentionality, took into account, besides "immanent" objects, also transcendent ones, in a way similar to Husserl, since such transcendent objects were not necessarily objects that exist.The "immanent object" (immanenter Gegenstand) was also called "presentedthing as presented" (Vorgestelltes als Vorgestelltes), whereas the transcendent object was called "object tout court" (Gegenstand schlechtweg) or "presented-thing tout court" (Vorgestelltes schlechtweg).Even if it is in Marty that one finds the clearest distinction between these two kinds of objects, other pupils of Brentano, and Brentano himself, made similar distinctions.Despite its importance, this point has been neglected in the Brentanian literature.In the first part of this article, I present the way immanent and transcendent objects have been distinguished in the School of Brentano.In the second part of the article, I present some problems linked to the distinction of two objects for every mental act, an immanent and a transcendent one; these problems could explain the abandonment of the notion of "immanent object" by many philosophers of the Brentanian tradition.I conclude with some remarks on the distinction between content and object in the School of Brentano.
Vivarium · 4 Zitationen · DOI
This paper analyses the ontological status of the ‘intellected thing’ ( res intellecta ) in Hervaeus Natalis. For Hervaeus an intellected thing is not a thing in the outer world, but something radically different, namely an internal, mind-dependent entity, something having a peculiar mode of being, ‘ esse obiective ’. While Hervaeus often says that the act of intellection is directed upon real things, this does not mean that the act is directed upon things existing actually outside the mind. Hervaeus argues that the act of intellection is directed upon things existing ‘aptitudinally’ outside the mind, not actually outside the mind. A thing existing aptitudinally outside the mind is a mind-dependent entity, something having esse obiective . In order to establish this point, I will explain how the property ‘being intellected’ ( esse intellectum ) should be interpreted in Hervaeus’ philosophy. This property is a peculiar type of relation, namely a relation of reason that gives a peculiar ontological status to its bearer. To neglect the distinction between actually outside and aptitudinally outside could falsely lead one to ascribe to Hervaeus a theory of intellection where the mental act is directed upon mind-independent entities.
PHENOMENOLOGICAL STUDIES - Revista da Abordagem Gestáltica · 3 Zitationen · DOI
Since the first discussion of Brentano's relation to (and account of) medieval philosophy by Spiegelberg in 1936, a fair amount of studies have been dedicated to the topic. And if those studies focused on some systematic issue at all, the beloved topic of intentionality clearly occupied a hegemonic position in the scholarly landscape. This paper considers the question from the point of view of ontology, and in a twofold perspective: What did Brentano know about medieval ontology and what kind of access did he have to that material (section 1)? What kind of use did Brentano make of medieval material in his own philosophy, and with what kind of results (section 2)?
3 Zitationen
This paper will present an analysis of the relational aspect of Brentano’s last theory of intentionality. My main thesis is that Brentano, at the end of his life, considered relations (relatives) without existent terms to be genuine relations (relatives). Thus, intentionality is a non-reducible real relation (the thinking subject is a non-reducible real relative) regardless of whether or not the object exists. I will use unpublished texts from the Brentanian Nachlass to support my argument.
Grazer Philosophische Studien · 2 Zitationen · DOI
Abstract The aim of my article is to present the critique by Brentanians – more precisely, by Brentano himself and his students Stumpf and Marty – of the thesis that colours are properties that are relational to a perceiver. For Brentanians, colours are monadic physical properties. Brentanians, I will show, think that colours do not exhibit a relationality to perception when we experience them, and that the concepts of them do not contain any mark representing a relation to perception; this phenomenological and logical non-relationality, they think, allows them to hold that colours are not relational by nature. Despite arguing that colours are monadic and physical, Brentanians also hold that colours do not exist in reality, and in their opinion these two theses are perfectly compatible. I will further show that although Brentanians (especially Marty) claim that colours are monadic, they nonetheless allow for a loose relationality of colours to perception which is, however, identical to that of any other physical property. I will conclude by discussing some interesting consequences of the Brentanian theory for contemporary debates about colours.
Synthese · 2 Zitationen · DOI
Abstract This paper aims to present and evaluate the (unduly neglected) account of the essence of colours developed by the early phenomenologist Adolf Reinach. Reinach claims that colours, as regards their nature or essence, are physical entities. He is opposed to the idea that colours are “subjective” or “psychic”. It might be the case that the colours we see in the world do not exist but are mere appearances. However, their non-existence would not entail any change in their essence: that is, they would not be psychic, but would just be non-existent physical entities. In Reinach’s view, we can be “ontic-neutral essentialists” about colours: we can remain neutral as to the existence of colours but still make claims about their essence. In the first part of the paper, I present Reinach’s take on the essence of colours. In the second part, I address his existential neutrality about colours; in particular, I argue that Reinach’s ontic-neutral essentialism brings to the fore a seldom noted but crucial distinction to be made in the discussion of colours, that between empirical and metaphysical non-realism about colours.
Topoi · 2 Zitationen · DOI
Abstract Brentano’s account of intentionality has often been traced back to its scholastic sources. This is justified by his claim that objects of thought have a specific mode of being—namely, “intentional inexistence” ( intentionale Inexistenz )—and that mental acts have an “intentional relation” ( intentionale Beziehung ) to these objects. These technical terms in Brentano do indeed recall the medieval notions of esse intentionale , which is a mode of being, and of intentio , which is a “tending towards” ( tendere in ) of mental acts. However, within the lexical family of intentio there is another distinction that plays an important role in medieval philosophy—namely, the distinction between first and second intentions ( intentio prima and intentio secunda ), which are, roughly speaking, concepts of things and concepts of concepts respectively. What is less well-known is that Brentano explicitly borrowed this distinction as well, and used it in his account of intentionality. This paper explores this little-known chapter in the scholastic-Austrian history of intentionality by evaluating both the historical accuracy and the philosophical significance of Brentano’s borrowing of the scholastic distinction between first and second intentions.
Inquiry · 2 Zitationen · DOI
This paper addresses the issue of how to best account for the diversity of our (synchronic) mental activities. The discussion starts with Mark Textor’s mental monism. According to mental monism, our mental life is constituted by just one simple mental act, in which different sub-acts can be conceptually distinguished. Textor grounds this view in the work of the early Brentano and contrasts it with the theory of the later Brentano, who introduces a mental substance into his philosophy. According to Textor, Brentano needs a substance because he is unable to explain how mental monism can account for the separability of our mental activities, e.g. the fact that I can stop hearing F while still seeing blue. Textor argues, however, that mental monism can solve this problem. I address two issues regarding Textor’s view. First, I challenge his interpretation of Brentano by arguing that the early Brentano imports ontological complexity into our mental life; I defend Brentano’s view against possible criticisms, and I address some objections to mental monism. Second, I oppose Textor’s narrative about the mental substance. I argue that Brentano needs a substance not to explain separability, but rather to individuate our mental acts. I still argue, however, that Brentano’s earlier view (understood in my sense) is better than the substance account for dividing the mind.
History and Philosophy of Logic · 2 Zitationen · DOI
This paper aims to reassess a notion in the works of the later Husserl that is both historically important and philosophically insightful, but remains understudied, namely, that of type. In opposition to a standard reading which treats Husserl’s type presentations as pre-conceptual habits, this paper argues that these representations are a specific kind of concept. More precisely, it shows that Husserl’s account of type presentations is akin to the contemporary prototype theory of concepts. This is historically important, since the predecessor of the prototype theory is usually said to be Wittgenstein. From a philosophical standpoint, the paper shows that Husserl has an innovative account of the connection between type concepts and their extension. Contrary to the standard view of extensions as sets and thus sharp entities, Husserl develops a correlationalist theory of concepts, according to which, for the specific characteristics in the structure of a concept, there are corresponding characteristics in the arrangement of its members, and vice versa. According to this theory, while sharp concepts lead to sharp extensions, vague concepts such as (proto)type concepts lead to vague extensions. The paper presents this understanding of Husserl in detail and explains its philosophical significance.
PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · 2 Zitationen
My paper aims at presenting Peter Auriol’s theory of cognition. Auriol holds that cognition is “something which makes an object appear to someone.” This claim, for Auriol, is meant to be indeterminate, as he explicitly says that the “something” in question can refer to any type of being. However, when he states how cognition is “implemented” in cognizers, Auriol specifies what this “something” is: for God, it is simply the deity itself; for creatures, cognition is described as something “absolute,” i.e. non-relational, more precisely a complex entity made up of a cognitive power and a “likeness.” However, one also finds Auriol saying that created cognition, as a “likeness,” is relative. Yet, when Auriol talks of created cognition as something relative, he does not make an ontological claim: he means that one cannot think of cognition without thinking of it as having a relation to an object. In brief, created cognition, for Auriol, is ontologically absolute, but it is always represented together with a relation.
Décadrages · 2 Zitationen · DOI
Les films de reportage de Peter Watkins, dont le mode documentarisant est perturbé par l’introduction de structures fictionnelles qui relèvent de l’ordre de l’anticipation, mobilisent systématiquement une stratégie de choc, dans une perspective politique : il s’agit de provoquer et de prendre à partie le spectateur, dans l’espoir que celui-ci se retourne de manière critique sur le façonnage des discours et de la représentation dans les mass media. Cette stratégie, qui repose sur la systématis...
European Journal of Philosophy · 1 Zitationen · DOI
Abstract This paper aims to present and evaluate Brentano's account of the individuation of mental acts. In his early works, Brentano assimilated mental acts to tropes; however, he encountered difficulties in explaining their individuation, since the usual solutions for the individuation of tropes were not readily applicable to his theory of mental acts. In a later period, Brentano introduced into his psychology what he called the “soul,” and this allowed him to explain the individuation of mental acts. Finally, after his “reistic” turn, he excluded mental acts from his ontology, for he rejected abstracta of any kind, including abstract particulars, and admitted only things, or res (in Latin), that is, concrete particulars; in his late philosophy, there are no “thinkings,” but only “thinkers.” However, he still needed to explain what individuates different thinkers, and this was again the soul. In the conclusion, the paper critically compares the different theoretical options considered by Brentano.
Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy · 1 Zitationen · DOI
Brentanians defend the view that there are distinct types of object, but that this does not entail the admission of different modes of being. The most general distinction among objects is the one between realia, which are causally efficacious, and irrealia, which are causally inert. As for being, which is equated with existence, it is understood in terms of “correct acknowledgeability.” This view was defended for some time by Brentano himself and then by his student Anton Marty. Their position is opposed to Bolzanian, Husserlian, and Meinongian ontologies, in which a distinction in the (higher) types of object implies a distinction in their mode of being. These Austro-German discussions anticipate much of the contemporary debate between Quineans, who accept only differences in objects, and neo-Meinongians or other ontological pluralists, who accept different modes of being. My paper first presents the Brentanian view in detail and then evaluates its philosophical significance.
History of analytic philosophy · 1 Zitationen · DOI
Revue philosophique de la France et de l étranger · 1 Zitationen · DOI
Dans quelle mesure l'outillage conceptuel de Brentano peut rendre compte des processus psychiques dont la découverte est usuellement attribuée à Freud ? Il y a, entre le maître Brentano et l'élève Freud, une opposition fondamentale : le premier rejette l'existence de processus psychiques inconscients, tandis que le second les érige en principe majeur d'explication de la vie psychique. Après le rappel des arguments de Freud en faveur de l'inconscient, deux concepts brentaniens négligés, ceux d'association et de disposition, sont présentés, qui permettent d'expliquer certains phénomènes dont l'étude est traditionnellement réservée à la psychanalyse.
Historical-analytical studies on nature, mind and action · 1 Zitationen · DOI
Les études philosophiques · 1 Zitationen · DOI
Par opposition à son maître Trendelenburg, qui ramenait les catégories aristotéliciennes à leur « origine grammaticale », Brentano, dans sa dissertation de 1862 sur l’ontologie d’Aristote, les qualifie de concepts d’étants. De ses premiers cours de métaphysique, donnés à Würzburg en 1867, jusqu’à ses derniers textes sur la question de l’être, datés de 1917, Brentano consacrera une part importante de ses réflexions aux catégories. Il reviendra non seulement sur la question du nombre des catégories, augmentant ou diminuant celui-ci, mais aussi sur la place à leur accorder dans une ontologie bien pensée. Durant ses années de maturité, Brentano proposera de distinguer, parmi les étants, les realia et les irrealia . Tandis que les realia sont des entités causalement actives, les irrealia sont causalement inertes et incluent ainsi les abstracta : l’humanité, la rougeur, etc. Se pose dès lors la question de savoir si les catégories sont concrètes ou abstraites, réelles ou irréelles. De la réponse à cette question dépendra en outre le sort des catégories chez le dernier Brentano, « réiste », dont l’ontologie se restreint au réel : puisque le réisme implique l’abandon des abstracta , les catégories ne survivraient pas à être abstraites.
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