Dr. Hamid Taieb

Dr. Hamid Taieb erforscht die Philosophiegeschichte der Intentionalität und der Sinnesqualitäten, mit aktuellem Fokus auf die Brentano-Schule und mittelalterliche Scholastik. Seine DFG-geförderte Emmy-Noether-Nachwuchsgruppe untersucht, wie Philosophen vom Mittelalter bis zur frühen Phänomenologie das Problem der sekundären Qualitäten (Farben, Töne, Gerüche) konzeptualisiert haben – also die Frage, ob diese Qualitäten objektive physische Eigenschaften oder subjektive mentale Konstrukte sind. Durch historisch-textanalytische Methoden rekonstruiert er vergessene oder unterschätzte Positionen (etwa von Peter Auriol oder Hervaeus Natalis), die zeigen, dass Nonrealismus über Sinnesqualitäten bereits im Mittelalter denkbar war. Die Forschung trägt zur Wissensgeschichte der Philosophie bei und bietet konzeptuelle Ressourcen für gegenwärtige Debatten in Philosophie des Geistes und Erkenntnistheorie.

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• NW/1: Eine sensible Welt. Das Problem der sekundären Qualitäten in und um die Brentanoschule

  Quelle ↗

  Förderer: DFG Nachwuchsgruppe Zeitraum: 09/2020 - 08/2023 Projektleitung: Dr. Hamid Taieb

• Emmy-Noether Research Group: A Sensible World. The Problem of Secondary Qualities in and Around the School of Brentano

  Quelle ↗

  Förderer: DFG Nachwuchsgruppe Zeitraum: 09/2023 - 02/2027 Projektleitung: Dr. Hamid Taieb, Prof. Dr. Dominik Perler, M.A. Lina Anne de Boer

• Eine sensible Welt. Das Problem der sekundären Qualitäten in und um die Brentano Schule

  Quelle ↗

  Förderer: DFG Nachwuchsgruppe Zeitraum: 09/2020 - 08/2026 Projektleitung: Dr. Hamid Taieb

• Relational Intentionality: Brentano and the Aristotelian Tradition

  2018

  Primary sources in phenomenology · DOI

• Intentionality and Reference: A Brentanian Distinction

  2016

  The Monist · DOI

  Brentano distinguishes between intentionality and reference. According to Brentano, all mental acts are intentionally directed toward something. Some mental acts also refer to something, which is the case when their object exists in reality. For Brentano, such acts, besides their intentionality, have a peculiar relation of similarity to their object. There is no mention of Brentano's distinction between intentionality and reference in the literature. Drawing on some less well known texts, this paper aims both at showing that Brentano makes such a distinction and at underscoring the philosophical significance of his position.

• The Road to <i>ideelle Verähnlichung</i>. Anton Marty’s Conception of Intentionality in the Light of its Brentanian Background

  2012

  Quaestio · DOI

  Anton Marty (1847-1914) is known to be the most faithful pupil of Franz Brentano. As a matter of fact, most of his philosophical ideas find their source in the works of his master. Yet, the faithfulness of Marty is not constant. As the rich correspondence between the two thinkers shows, Marty elaborates an original theory of intentionality from ca. 1904 onward. This theory is based on the idea that intentionality is a process of mental assimilation (ideelle Verähnlichung), a process at the core of which lies a sui generis relation of “ideal similitude” holding between a thinking subject and its object. This study spells out the Martyian notion of mental assimilation and traces back Marty’s evolution from his earlier position (prominently described in the recently published Deskriptive Psychologie of 1893-1894) to his final view as it is found in the Untersuchungen of 1908. It turns out that besides Brentano, Husserl is a key figure in that evolution. Such a “genetic”elucidation of Marty’s last theory is required in order to reach the main goal of this paper, namely: the clarification of Marty’s degree of dependence upon Brentano with respect to the theory of intentionality. That being said, we do not merely intend to compare the mature Marty with Brentano: our “genetic” considerations will also allow us to describe the interaction between the two thinkers before 1904. Accordingly, we begin by presenting Brentano’s own position on intentionality in discussing its two currently competing readings, namely the “discontinuist” and the “continuist” one. Against a recent interpretation, we argue that Marty’s endorsement of a “discontinuist” reading is not based on a misunderstanding of Brentano’s position.