Prof. Dr. Anastasia Danilov
Profil
Forschungsthemen1
SFB 190/2: Anreize, Unternehmensführung und Arbeitsorganisation (TP B05)
Quelle ↗Förderer: DFG Sonderforschungsbereich Zeitraum: 01/2021 - 12/2024 Projektleitung: Prof. Dr. Anastasia Danilov, Prof. Dr. Anja Schöttner
Mögliche Industrie-Partner10
Stand: 26.4.2026, 19:48:44 (Top-K=20, Min-Cosine=0.4)
- 10 Treffer58.0%
- Gamification for Climate ActionP58.0%
- Gamification for Climate Action
- 3 Treffer56.9%
- Zuwendung im Rahmen des Programms „exist – Existenzgründungen aus der Wissenschaft“ aus dem Bundeshaushalt, Einzelplan 09, Kapitel 02, Titel 68607, Haushaltsjahr 2026, sowie aus Mitteln des Europäischen Strukturfonds (hier Euro-päischer Sozialfonds Plus – ESF Plus) Förderperiode 2021-2027 – Kofinanzierung für das Vorhaben: „exist Women“T56.9%
- Zuwendung im Rahmen des Programms „exist – Existenzgründungen aus der Wissenschaft“ aus dem Bundeshaushalt, Einzelplan 09, Kapitel 02, Titel 68607, Haushaltsjahr 2026, sowie aus Mitteln des Europäischen Strukturfonds (hier Euro-päischer Sozialfonds Plus – ESF Plus) Förderperiode 2021-2027 – Kofinanzierung für das Vorhaben: „exist Women“
- 6 Treffer55.3%
- SKILLAB: Monitoring The Demand And Supply Of Skills In The European Labour MarketP55.3%
- SKILLAB: Monitoring The Demand And Supply Of Skills In The European Labour Market
- 5 Treffer55.3%
- SKILLAB: Monitoring The Demand And Supply Of Skills In The European Labour MarketP55.3%
- SKILLAB: Monitoring The Demand And Supply Of Skills In The European Labour Market
- 6 Treffer55.3%
- SKILLAB: Monitoring The Demand And Supply Of Skills In The European Labour MarketP55.3%
- SKILLAB: Monitoring The Demand And Supply Of Skills In The European Labour Market
- 6 Treffer55.3%
- SKILLAB: Monitoring The Demand And Supply Of Skills In The European Labour MarketP55.3%
- SKILLAB: Monitoring The Demand And Supply Of Skills In The European Labour Market
- Playing beyond CLILP54.6%
- Playing beyond CLIL
- 2 Treffer54.6%
- Playing beyond CLILP54.6%
- Playing beyond CLIL
- 2 Treffer54.6%
- Playing beyond CLILP54.6%
- Playing beyond CLIL
- 2 Treffer54.6%
- Playing beyond CLILP54.6%
- Playing beyond CLIL
Publikationen23
Top 25 nach Zitationen — Quelle: OpenAlex (BAAI/bge-m3 embedded für Matching).
Face masks increase compliance with physical distancing recommendations during the COVID-19 pandemic
2021Journal of the Economic Science Association · 58 Zitationen · DOI
Abstract Governments across the world have implemented restrictive policies to slow the spread of COVID-19. Recommended face mask use has been a controversially discussed policy, among others, due to potential adverse effects on physical distancing. Using a randomized field experiment ( N = 300), we show that individuals kept a significantly larger distance from someone wearing a face mask than from an unmasked person during the early days of the pandemic. According to an additional survey experiment ( N = 456) conducted at the time, masked individuals were not perceived as being more infectious than unmasked ones, but they were believed to prefer more distancing. This result suggests that wearing a mask served as a social signal that led others to increase the distance they kept. Our findings provide evidence against the claim that mask use creates a false sense of security that would negatively affect physical distancing. Furthermore, our results suggest that behavior has informational content that may be affected by policies.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · 57 Zitationen · DOI
Management Science · 53 Zitationen · DOI
We investigate whether incentive schemes signal social norms and thus affect behavior beyond their direct economic consequences. A one-shot principal–agent experiment is studied where prior to contract choice principals are informed about the past actions of other agents and thus have more information about norms of behavior. Compared with a setting in which principals are uninformed, agents exert substantially higher effort under a fixed wage contract when they are aware that an informed principal chose this contract. The informed principal’s choice apparently signals a norm not to exploit trust, which leads to more trustworthy behavior. This mechanism’s robustness is explored in further experiments. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2336 . This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · 29 Zitationen · DOI
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · 20 Zitationen · DOI
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · 12 Zitationen · DOI
Time for helping
2015Journal of the Economic Science Association · 11 Zitationen · DOI
Abstract This study investigates whether individuals engage in prosocial behavior when it requires an investment of their time, but not money. In a laboratory experiment with rigorous anonymity arrangements, senders receive their payoff at the beginning. They may then engage in a tedious task to increase the earnings of exogenously disadvantaged recipients who otherwise receive no earnings. We find that senders are willing to sacrifice time to benefit recipients. Whether or not the recipient is present in the laboratory during the working time does not alter this decision. However, in a treatment variation some senders also display antisocial behavior.
CESifo Economic Studies · 10 Zitationen · DOI
Abstract Using a survey with 57 German firms, we evaluate the level of digitalization of the human resource management (HRM) function and document perceived benefits and barriers of technology adoption from organizational and individual users’ perspectives. The results give reason for optimism. Most of the companies report that the core HR processes are digitized. We do not observe adverse effects of the digital HRM tools on users’ job satisfaction and work stress. Still, more than half of companies do not yet use digital tools for strategic HRM decisions. Respondents appreciate the increased speed and cost-efficiency of digital HR processes and associate them with a competitive advantage in talent acquisition. The most prominent barriers to adoption are lack of qualified professionals, high costs, and uncertainty regarding the legal framework. Additionally, we test whether small- and medium-sized enterprises differ systematically from larger organizations in how they use digital HRM tools.
SSRN Electronic Journal · 7 Zitationen · DOI
PLoS ONE · 4 Zitationen · DOI
This study explores the role of trait self-control in individuals' changes in performance and well-being when working from home (WFH). In a three-wave longitudinal study with UK workers in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, we find that low self-control workers experienced a significant positive adjustment to WFH over time: The number of reported work distractions decreased, and self-assessed performance increased over the period of four months. In contrast, high self-control individuals did not show a similar upward trajectory. Despite the positive adjustment of low self-control individuals over time, on average, self-control was still positively associated with performance and negatively associated with work distractions. However, trait self-control was not consistently associated with changes in well-being. These findings provide a more nuanced view on trait self-control, suggesting that low self-control individuals can improve initial performance over time when working from home.
Academy of Management Proceedings · 3 Zitationen · DOI
Every organization rests on some form of hierarchical structure. We experimentally study how different organizational reporting hierarchies influence dishonesty of group members. Group members report the outcome of a private die-roll to their group. Group members get payoffs, only if all three reports are identical. We vary the reporting hierarchies, i.e., whether all subjects report simultaneously, as in flat hierarchies, or sequentially, as in steep hierarchies where one person, the leader, is asked to report first. We observe what we term ‘the honest leader effect’, as the levels of dishonesty are highest in flat hierarchies without a leader. In additional studies we investigate into the driving forces of ‘the honest leader effect’ and show that the fact that leaders behavior is exposed to the group triggers image concerns, which in turn lead to more ethical outcomes. Our study offers a new view on the effect of hierarchies on ethical outcomes and the role of psychological factors on leadership behavior. Existing studies that focused mainly on the effect of leadership on group behavior, we shift the focus on how the leadership role can influence leader’s behavior.
Norms and Guilt
2018RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · 2 Zitationen
It has been argued that guilt aversion (the aversion to violate others’ expectations) and the compliance to descriptive social norms (the aversion to act differently than others in the same situation) are important drivers of human behavior. We show in a formal model that both motives are empirically indistinguishable when only one benchmark (another person’s expectation or a norm) is revealed as each of these benchmarks signals information on the other one. To address this problem, we experimentally study how individuals react when both benchmarks are revealed simultaneously. We find that both types of information affect transfers in the dictator game. At the same time, the effect of the recipient’s expectation is non-monotonic as dictators use the disclosed expectation in a self-serving way to decrease transfers.
PsycEXTRA Dataset · 2 Zitationen · DOI
In an experiment with professionals from the financial services sector, we investigate the impact of a team incentive scheme on recommendation quality of investment products when advisors benefit from advising lower quality products.Experimental results reveal that, when group affiliation is strong, worse products are recommended significantly more often under team incentives than under individual incentives.
Time for Helping
2014RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · 1 Zitationen
This study investigates whether individuals engage in prosocial behavior when it requires their time but not money. In a lab experiment with rigorous anonymity arrangements, subjects receive their payoff beforehand and can engage in a tedious task to increase the earnings of a passive recipient. We find that individuals work for a significant amount of time.
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
We study, how help can be fostered under relative rewards by means of team bonus and corporate value statements. A simple model analysis suggests that team members help less as relative rewards increase. As one potential measure to encourage help, we augment relative rewards with team rewards determined by the output of the whole team. This theoretical benchmark is tested in an experiment. Furthermore, we provide the first clean one-shot experimental test of the Lazear and Rosen (1981) tournament model. In a second experiment, we investigate the effectiveness of corporate value statements to encourage help.
SSRN Electronic Journal · DOI
SSRN Electronic Journal · DOI
AEA Randomized Controlled Trials · DOI
This document reports additional of the results of the experiment pre-registered as AEARCTR-0009365 in connection to the pre-analysis plan submitted at the time of pre-registration.Here, we also identify and specify any deviations from the original pre-analysis plan.The complete analysis is available in our research paper. Research questionsAs stated in the pre-analysis plan, our primary research question was to examine how managers adjust their leadership styles based on labor market conditions.Additionally, we aimed to analyze the impact of these leadership styles on workers' behaviors, such as contract acceptance and effort levels.
AEA Randomized Controlled Trials · DOI
AEA Randomized Controlled Trials · DOI
Актуальные проблемы авиации и космонавтики
Helping in Teams
2014RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
We study, how help can be fostered under relative rewards by means of team bonus and corporate value statements. A simple model analysis suggests that team members help less as relative rewards increase. As one potential measure to encourage help, we augment relative rewards with team rewards determined by the output of the whole team. This theoretical benchmark is tested in an experiment. Furthermore, we provide the first clean one-shot experimental test of the Lazear and Rosen (1981) tournament model. In a second experiment, we investigate the effectiveness of corporate value statements to encourage help.
PsycEXTRA Dataset · DOI
Kooperationen1
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SFB 190/2: Anreize, Unternehmensführung und Arbeitsorganisation (TP B05)
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- Name
- Prof. Dr. Anastasia Danilov
- Titel
- Prof. Dr.
- Fakultät
- Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
- Institut
- Organisationsökonomik - Zukunft der Arbeit (J)(S)
- Telefon
- +49 30 2093-99528
- HU-FIS-Profil
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- 26.4.2026, 01:03:45