Prof. Dr. Achim Hagen
Profil
Forschungsthemen3
Die Politische Ökonomie der nachhaltigen Transformation des Klima-Finanz-Systems
Quelle ↗Förderer: Bundesministerium für Forschung, Technologie und Raumfahrt Zeitraum: 10/2022 - 09/2027 Projektleitung: Prof. Dr. Achim Hagen
Ökonomie des Klimawandels – Verbundprojekt: Fossile Energieträger und Klimapolitik – Stranded Assets, Erwartungen, und die politische Ökonomie des Klimawandels (FoReSee) – Teilprojekt 3: Verteilungseffekte und die politische Ökonomie von Klimapolitik
Quelle ↗Förderer: Bundesministerium für Forschung, Technologie und Raumfahrt Zeitraum: 10/2018 - 09/2022 Projektleitung: Prof. Dr. Klaus Eisenack
Planspielbasierte Bildung zu erneuerbaren Energien in Deutschland und Osteuropa (KCeast)
Quelle ↗Förderer: Deutsche Bundesstiftung Umwelt Zeitraum: 12/2017 - 01/2020 Projektleitung: Prof. Dr. Klaus Eisenack
Mögliche Industrie-Partner10
Stand: 26.4.2026, 19:48:44 (Top-K=20, Min-Cosine=0.4)
- 31 Treffer60.1%
- Gamification for Climate ActionP60.1%
- Gamification for Climate Action
- 21 Treffer59.3%
- Sortenstrategien bei landwirtschaftlichen Nutzpflanzen zur Anpassung an den KlimawandelP59.3%
- Sortenstrategien bei landwirtschaftlichen Nutzpflanzen zur Anpassung an den Klimawandel
Landesamt für Verbraucherschutz, Landwirtschaft und Flurneuordnung Brandenburg
P21 Treffer59.3%- Sortenstrategien bei landwirtschaftlichen Nutzpflanzen zur Anpassung an den KlimawandelP59.3%
- Sortenstrategien bei landwirtschaftlichen Nutzpflanzen zur Anpassung an den Klimawandel
- 22 Treffer59.3%
- Sortenstrategien bei landwirtschaftlichen Nutzpflanzen zur Anpassung an den KlimawandelP59.3%
- Sortenstrategien bei landwirtschaftlichen Nutzpflanzen zur Anpassung an den Klimawandel
- 3 Treffer57.7%
- Zuwendung im Rahmen des Programms „exist – Existenzgründungen aus der Wissenschaft“ aus dem Bundeshaushalt, Einzelplan 09, Kapitel 02, Titel 68607, Haushaltsjahr 2026, sowie aus Mitteln des Europäischen Strukturfonds (hier Euro-päischer Sozialfonds Plus – ESF Plus) Förderperiode 2021-2027 – Kofinanzierung für das Vorhaben: „exist Women“T57.7%
- Zuwendung im Rahmen des Programms „exist – Existenzgründungen aus der Wissenschaft“ aus dem Bundeshaushalt, Einzelplan 09, Kapitel 02, Titel 68607, Haushaltsjahr 2026, sowie aus Mitteln des Europäischen Strukturfonds (hier Euro-päischer Sozialfonds Plus – ESF Plus) Förderperiode 2021-2027 – Kofinanzierung für das Vorhaben: „exist Women“
- 24 Treffer56.2%
- Nachhaltigkeitsbasierte Wertschöpfungsketten als Teil des Green Deal: Strategien für Vertrauensbildung und TransparenzP56.2%
- Nachhaltigkeitsbasierte Wertschöpfungsketten als Teil des Green Deal: Strategien für Vertrauensbildung und Transparenz
- 25 Treffer56.1%
- I-REDD+ - Impacts of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and Enhancing Carbon StocksP56.1%
- I-REDD+ - Impacts of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and Enhancing Carbon Stocks
- 25 Treffer56.1%
- I-REDD+ - Impacts of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and Enhancing Carbon StocksP56.1%
- I-REDD+ - Impacts of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and Enhancing Carbon Stocks
Centro de Investigacion Ecologica Y Aplicaciones Forestales Consorcio
PT17 Treffer56.1%- EU: CLEARING HOUSE – Collaborative Learning in Research, Information-Sharing and Governance on How Urban Forest-Based Solutions Support Sino-European Urban FuturesP56.1%
- EU: CLEARING HOUSE – Collaborative Learning in Research, Information-Sharing and Governance on How Urban Forest-Based Solutions Support Sino-European Urban Futures
- EU: CLEARING HOUSE – Collaborative Learning in Research, Information-Sharing and Governance on How Urban Forest-Based Solutions Support Sino-European Urban FuturesP56.1%
- EU: CLEARING HOUSE – Collaborative Learning in Research, Information-Sharing and Governance on How Urban Forest-Based Solutions Support Sino-European Urban Futures
Publikationen25
Top 25 nach Zitationen — Quelle: OpenAlex (BAAI/bge-m3 embedded für Matching).
Diagnostics · 41 Zitationen · DOI
Our data suggest that VMI at 60-70 keV provides the best objective and subjective image quality concerning vessel contrast irrespective of vessel size.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · 25 Zitationen · DOI
We investigate whether trade sanctions against outsiders can foster climate cooperation in self-enforcing international environmental agreements if outsiders retaliate. We find a threshold effect: In small coalitions incentives to be a coalition member decrease whereas in large coalitions they increase. Thus, trade sanctions can be an effective tool in climate policy only after a sufficiently large climate coalition has already been formed. Even if larger stable coalitions are achieved with trade sanctions, implications for global welfare can be adverse, because additional trade distortions trade off with the environmental gains. We identify the USA and Europe as essential members of stable coalitions if outsiders retaliate.
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy · 20 Zitationen · DOI
Many types of capital stocks—natural, physical, and human—stand to lose value because of climate policy and to become “stranded.” The owners of such assets will resist climate policies. We survey the recent climate economics literature and highlight research gaps related to stranded assets. In line with recent literature in political science, we argue that economists can provide more effective policy recommendations by putting greater emphasis on the distributional consequences of asset stranding. Our recommended policies focus on targeting new capital stocks related to energy production and consumption: banning fossil-intensive investment and encouraging investment into renewable and energy-efficient capital. These policies may face less resistance than price-based mechanisms and could improve the credibility of future carbon pricing.
Energy Research & Social Science · 20 Zitationen · DOI
Games · 13 Zitationen · DOI
Coalition formation is often analysed in an almost non-cooperative way, as a two-stage game that consists of a first stage comprising membership actions and a second stage with physical actions, such as the provision of a public good. We formalised this widely used approach for the case where actions are simultaneous in each stage. Herein, we give special attention to the case of a symmetric physical game. Various theoretical results, in particular, for cartel games, are provided. As they are crucial, recent results on the uniqueness of coalitional equilibria of Cournot-like physical games are reconsidered. Various concrete examples are included. Finally, we discuss research strategies to obtain results about equilibrium coalition structures with abstract physical games in terms of qualitative properties of their primitives.
Climate Change Economics · 13 Zitationen · DOI
We investigate whether global cooperation on emissions abatement can be improved if asymmetric countries agree to sign one out of several environmental agreements. The analysis is based on a two-stage game theoretical model. Conditions for stable coalitions and the resulting global emissions are determined. We allow for multiple coalitions with all countries being different, and analyze the effects in the cases of increasing marginal damages from emissions and of decreasing marginal benefits of emissions. We find that in the case of decreasing marginal benefits and constant marginal damages, admitting multiple coalitions increases the number of cooperating countries and reduces emissions (compared to the standard case with a single coalition). For increasing marginal damages and constant marginal benefits, however, multiple stable coalitions cannot coexist. If both damages and benefits are nonlinear, admitting multiple coalitions can decrease emissions. The paper thus contributes to the emerging discussion on the scope and limits of climate clubs.
International Environmental Agreements Politics Law and Economics · 11 Zitationen · DOI
Abstract This paper examines the effects of political pressure groups (lobbies) on transboundary emissions of individual countries and on the stability of international environmental agreements to reduce emissions. We consider two types of lobbies, industry and environmentalists, and we allow for asymmetric countries to consider differences in lobby strengths to study strategic international spillovers of national lobby activities. In our model, lobby groups in countries that are non-signatories to the agreement will impact abatement of the lobby’s home country only. In contrast, lobby activities in signatory countries have spillover effects on the abatement decisions of other member countries. As lobby strength impacts abatement, it will, in turn, impact the incentives to participate in the agreement. We find that lobby activities from both lobby groups, industry and environmentalists, can have the potential to facilitate international cooperation to abate global pollution. This, however, depends on the distribution of lobby activities across countries and on whether green lobby groups have a national or international focus.
Diagnostics · 9 Zitationen · DOI
Our research suggests 70 keV might be the best compromise for reducing metal artifacts affecting vascular structures and preventing vascular contrast if solely using VME reconstructions. VME imaging shows only significant effects on the general artifact burden. Vascular structures generally experience fewer metal artifacts than soft tissue due to their greater distance from the teeth, which are a common source of such artifacts.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · 7 Zitationen · DOI
We study the influence of industrial lobbying on national climate policies and the formation of an international environmental agreement if the coalition countries use border carbon adjustments to protect domestic producers. We find that the effects of this political influence crucially depend on the distribution of carbon tax revenues. If these are transferred to the households, lobbying distorts carbon taxes downwards to reduce the tax burden and does not affect coalition sizes. This leads to higher emissions and lower welfare. By contrast, if tax revenues are given back to the firms, lobbies in the outsider countries favor carbon taxes, whereas lobbies in the coalition countries favor carbon subsidies to raise the international commodity price. This reduces the tax difference and the welfare difference between the countries, which reduces the free-rider incentives. Then, lobbying stabilizes the grand coalition and reduces global emissions compared to a “perfect” world without lobbying if the political influence is sufficiently strong.
Diagnostics · 7 Zitationen · DOI
Our research suggests that virtual monoenergetic images at 40 keV in Mono+ mode derived from a PCD-CT can be a feasible alternative to a true arterial phase for assessment of vessels with worse CNR and SNR.
SSRN Electronic Journal · 6 Zitationen · DOI
In spite of scientific agreement on the negative effects of anthropogenic climate change, efforts to find cooperative solutions on the international level have been unsatisfactory so far. Trade sanctions in the form of import tariffs are one principal measure discussed as a means to foster cooperation. Former studies have concluded that import tariffs are an effective mechanism to establish international cooperation. However, most of these studies rely on the assumption that outsiders are not able to retaliate, i.e. to implement import tariffs themselves. In this paper we use combined analytical and numerical analysis to investigate implications of retaliation. We find a threshold effect: below a certain coalition size the effect of retaliation predominates and decreases incentives to be a coalition member. In coalitions above the threshold size the effect of trade sanctions that stabilizes coalitions dominates and enables the formation of larger stable coalitions. Our analysis suggests that only after a sufficiently large climate coalition has already been formed, the threat of trade sanctions might be an effective stick to establish the grand coalition.
Energy Research & Social Science · 5 Zitationen · DOI
5 Zitationen · DOI
This chapter provides some transnational initiatives for climate cooperation. The global governance literature finds ample empirical evidence for emerging transnational environmental agreements (TEAs). The chapter puts together some selected and documented empirical observations of transnational environmental agreements, and summarizes relevant publications from the global governance literature. Climate clubs can be understood as 'Club-like arrangements between states that share common climate-related concerns, and sometimes in partnership with non-state actors such as companies and Non-Governmental Organizations'. International environmental agreements with a focus on climate agreements have been analysed in the economic literature since the 1990s. This has led to the development of various models that serve as a starting point for the analysis of TEAs. Climate clubs offer an opportunity to cooperate in more than one agreement at the same time. Cities can form alliances in which they agree to mitigate greenhouse gases; the effectiveness of such TEAs will depend on the political influence cities have on national governments.
Environmental Research Letters · 4 Zitationen · DOI
Abstract Despite the urgent need for ambitious national climate policies to reduce carbon emissions, their implementation lacks stringency. This lack of policy stringency is driven by a complex combination of a country’s numerous politico-economic, institutional and socio-economic characteristics. While extant studies aim at estimating causal effects between a selection of such characteristics and policy stringency, we examine the importance of a comprehensive set of predictors that underlie such empirical models. For this purpose, we employ machine-learning methods on a data set covering 22 potential predictors of policy stringency for 95 countries. Conditional random forests suggest that the most important predictors of policy stringency are of institutional nature: freedom (of press, media, associations, and elections), governmental effectiveness, and control of corruption. Further, accumulated local effects plots suggest that the relationship between some predictors, e.g. freedom or education, and policy stringency is highly non-linear.
Wirtschaftsdienst · 3 Zitationen · DOI
Publication Database PIK (Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK)) · 2 Zitationen · DOI
Diagnostics · 1 Zitationen · DOI
<b>Background</b>: Computed tomography (CT) is the standard of reference for diagnosis and follow-up in aortic dissection (AD). Localizing the entry and identifying false and true lumen are as important as differing post-treatment changes from contrast media extravasations. Photon-counting detector CT (PCDCT) allows for virtual monoenergetic (VME) reconstructions, which can augment contrast media effects on lower energy levels, and for virtual non-contrast (VNC) reconstructions. The aim of this study was to analyze the influence of VME reconstructions on contrast media effects in different dissection compartments as well as compare true and VNC series in AD patients. <b>Methods</b>: We retrospectively analyzed PCDCT datasets from 28 patients with aortic dissections, with different dissection types and different treatment statuses. Attenuation and standard deviation values of the ascending and descending aorta, as well as CT values of the false lumen, were measured. These measurements were obtained from VME images at energy levels ranging from 40 to 190 keV in 10 keV increments, as well as from non-contrast (NC) and VNC reconstructions. The signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) was calculated. Additionally, subjective values for dissection assessability and native aspects of the images were acquired for different reconstructions. <b>Results</b>: CT values decreased with higher energy levels in VME imaging. Ascending aorta showed higher attenuation values than descending aorta, which was higher than false lumen (e.g., at 70 keV ascending 357 [310; 419] HU, descending 346 [305; 401] HU and false lumen 298 [248; 363] HU). These differences increased on lower VME reconstructions with statistical significance for the comparisons of ascending and descending aorta with the false lumen on all energy levels. In line with this, SNR showed highest values for ascending aorta compared to descending aorta and false lumen on all energy levels. For NC comparisons, VNC and VME at 190 keV reconstructions showed higher CT values than NC reconstructions (e.g., overall data NC 48 [42; 55] HU, VNC 66 [57; 73] HU, 190 keV 97 [89; 105] HU). Subjective ratings were worse with VNC than with NC images. <b>Conclusions</b>: VME reconstructions on lower energy levels can be helpful in differentiating between true and false lumen in aortic dissections.
Energy Economics · 1 Zitationen · DOI
Unilateral climate policies can lead to carbon leakage between countries. Deposit markets, where participants trade the right to keep fossil fuels unexploited in-situ, are a promising policy proposal to prevent leakage. For a single fossil fuel, deposit markets can only restore efficiency if there is no market power on the deposit market. With multiple fuels, however, multiple (interdependent) deposit markets could give rise to additional market power. We thus study deposit markets with market power and multiple fuels, and focus on comparing second-best policies. In contrast to a setting with a single fuel, more complex carbon leakage channels between both, countries and fuels, arise. Such effects can even hinder deposit markets covering all fuels from being implemented. At the same time, we identify conditions where deposit markets induce countries without emission reduction incentives to supply a cleaner fuel mix. Regarding the political economy, deposit markets covering all fuels can improve each country’s welfare compared to those covering only one fuel. Deposit markets which cover only a single fuel or multiple fuels rank differently in terms of consumer and producer rents. These welfare rankings can have highly relevant implications for policy-making. Even with market power, deposit markets covering multiple fuels can Pareto-dominate a situation with unilateral, domestic policies.
SSRN Electronic Journal · 1 Zitationen · DOI
Earth System Governance · DOI
Limiting global warming in line with the Paris Agreement requires net-zero emissions by mid-century. To address uncertainties in this transition, prior research has developed low-carbon scenarios. We contribute by eliciting expert judgement through online surveys with 21 experts and applying the Cross Impact Balances method to construct exploratory qualitative scenarios for the European Union. These scenarios complement quantitative approaches and reflect interactions among financial markets, technological innovation, political economy, and climate policy variables. We identify two internally consistent scenarios: one aligned with mitigation goals and one diverging. The mitigation scenario leads to 1.5 °C warming and features high and stable CO 2 prices, a green mandate from the European Central Bank, high-quality climate risk data, accelerated economic development, and reduced inequality, despite public resistance and corporate lobbying by high-carbon sectors. Within the expert-based scenario analysis, results indicate that green financial policies are not essential for shifting market expectations towards the low-carbon transition.
RöFo - Fortschritte auf dem Gebiet der Röntgenstrahlen und der bildgebenden Verfahren · DOI
SSRN Electronic Journal · DOI
SSRN Electronic Journal · DOI
SSRN Electronic Journal · DOI
Economics and Politics · DOI
ABSTRACT Public policy reforms often benefit certain societal groups while being costly for others. Both supporters and opponents of reforms can form lobby groups to influence the policy outcome in their preferred direction. This paper presents a simple two‐stage model of a public policy reform that results from the partial implementation of a policy proposal. The compromise is modeled as a share contest. I analyze the influence of lobby groups on equilibrium policies and how regulators' preferences for lobbying activities influence the policy proposal. The results show that in regimes where these activities are regarded as harmful, lobby efforts lead to modest reform proposals and equilibrium reforms, whereas in regimes where regulators favor lobbying activities the levels of reform proposal and resulting policy are higher. Interest groups that suffer costs from the reform are always better off in regimes that regard lobbying as harmful, whereas groups that profit from a reform can be better off with regulators that favor lobby contributions.
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Bestätigte Forscher↔Partner-Paare aus HU-FIS — Gold-Standard-Positive für das Matching.
Die Politische Ökonomie der nachhaltigen Transformation des Klima-Finanz-Systems
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Identität, Organisation und Kontakt aus HU-FIS.
- Name
- Prof. Dr. Achim Hagen
- Titel
- Prof. Dr.
- Fakultät
- Lebenswissenschaftliche Fakultät
- Institut
- Albrecht Daniel Thaer-Institut für Agrar- und Gartenbauwissenschaften
- Arbeitsgruppe
- Ressourcenökonomie
- Telefon
- +49 30 2093-46376
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- 26.4.2026, 01:05:41