Prof. Dr. Anja Schöttner
Profil
Forschungsthemen5
Geschäftsstelle der Berlin School of Economics (BSE) / des Berlin Doctoral Program in Economics and Management Science (BDPEMS) - Finanzielle Unterstützung durch die Universität Potsdam
Quelle ↗Förderer: Land Brandenburg Zeitraum: 01/2019 - 12/2020 Projektleitung: Prof. Dr. Anja Schöttner
SFB 190/2: Anreize, Unternehmensführung und Arbeitsorganisation (TP B05)
Quelle ↗Förderer: DFG Sonderforschungsbereich Zeitraum: 01/2021 - 12/2024 Projektleitung: Prof. Dr. Anastasia Danilov, Prof. Dr. Anja Schöttner
SFB/TRR 190/3: Anreize, Unternehmensführung und Arbeitsorganisation (TP B05)
Quelle ↗Förderer: DFG Sonderforschungsbereich Zeitraum: 01/2025 - 12/2028 Projektleitung: Prof. Dr. Anja Schöttner
SFB-TRR 266/1: Transparenzwirkungen von Organisationsinnovationen (TP A02)
Quelle ↗Förderer: DFG Sonderforschungsbereich Zeitraum: 07/2019 - 06/2023 Projektleitung: Prof. Dr. Anja Schöttner
SFB/TRR 266/2: Transparenzwirkungen von Organisationsinnovationen (TP A02)
Quelle ↗Förderer: DFG Sonderforschungsbereich Zeitraum: 07/2023 - 06/2027 Projektleitung: Prof. Dr. Anja Schöttner, Prof. Dr. Anna Rohlfing-Bastian
Mögliche Industrie-Partner10
Stand: 26.4.2026, 19:48:44 (Top-K=20, Min-Cosine=0.4)
- 25 Treffer59.6%
- Gamification for Climate ActionP59.6%
- Gamification for Climate Action
- 9 Treffer59.2%
- Zuwendung im Rahmen des Programms „exist – Existenzgründungen aus der Wissenschaft“ aus dem Bundeshaushalt, Einzelplan 09, Kapitel 02, Titel 68607, Haushaltsjahr 2026, sowie aus Mitteln des Europäischen Strukturfonds (hier Euro-päischer Sozialfonds Plus – ESF Plus) Förderperiode 2021-2027 – Kofinanzierung für das Vorhaben: „exist Women“T59.2%
- Zuwendung im Rahmen des Programms „exist – Existenzgründungen aus der Wissenschaft“ aus dem Bundeshaushalt, Einzelplan 09, Kapitel 02, Titel 68607, Haushaltsjahr 2026, sowie aus Mitteln des Europäischen Strukturfonds (hier Euro-päischer Sozialfonds Plus – ESF Plus) Förderperiode 2021-2027 – Kofinanzierung für das Vorhaben: „exist Women“
- Promoting Deaf and Hard of Hearing Children's Theory of Mind and Emotion UnderstandingP57.2%
- Promoting Deaf and Hard of Hearing Children's Theory of Mind and Emotion Understanding
- 17 Treffer57.2%
- Promoting Deaf and Hard of Hearing Children's Theory of Mind and Emotion UnderstandingP57.2%
- Promoting Deaf and Hard of Hearing Children's Theory of Mind and Emotion Understanding
- 17 Treffer57.2%
- Promoting Deaf and Hard of Hearing Children's Theory of Mind and Emotion UnderstandingP57.2%
- Promoting Deaf and Hard of Hearing Children's Theory of Mind and Emotion Understanding
- 17 Treffer57.2%
- Promoting Deaf and Hard of Hearing Children's Theory of Mind and Emotion UnderstandingP57.2%
- Promoting Deaf and Hard of Hearing Children's Theory of Mind and Emotion Understanding
- 17 Treffer57.2%
- Promoting Deaf and Hard of Hearing Children's Theory of Mind and Emotion UnderstandingP57.2%
- Promoting Deaf and Hard of Hearing Children's Theory of Mind and Emotion Understanding
- 15 Treffer55.9%
- SKILLAB: Monitoring The Demand And Supply Of Skills In The European Labour MarketP55.9%
- SKILLAB: Monitoring The Demand And Supply Of Skills In The European Labour Market
- 17 Treffer55.9%
- SKILLAB: Monitoring The Demand And Supply Of Skills In The European Labour MarketP55.9%
- SKILLAB: Monitoring The Demand And Supply Of Skills In The European Labour Market
- 15 Treffer55.9%
- SKILLAB: Monitoring The Demand And Supply Of Skills In The European Labour MarketP55.9%
- SKILLAB: Monitoring The Demand And Supply Of Skills In The European Labour Market
Publikationen25
Top 25 nach Zitationen — Quelle: OpenAlex (BAAI/bge-m3 embedded für Matching).
The Journal of Law Economics and Organization · 71 Zitationen · DOI
This article analyzes optimal job design in a repeated principal-agent relationship when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for three tasks whose contribution to firm value is nonverifiable. The tasks can be assigned to either one or two agents. Assigning an additional task to an agent strengthens his relational contract. Therefore, broad task assignments are optimal when the performance measure strongly distorts incentives for the two-task job. This is more likely to be the case if these two tasks are substitutes. The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org, Oxford University Press.
Economic Theory · 57 Zitationen · DOI
The Leadership Quarterly · 51 Zitationen · DOI
Management Science · 48 Zitationen · DOI
This paper studies optimal sales force compensation plans in a multiperiod moral-hazard model when the firm wants to implement high effort in every period but only obtains aggregate information on sales. The sales agent chooses effort each period after observing previous sales, and his incentive responsiveness might change over time. The paper derives conditions under which a linear incentive scheme—a pure commission—dominates a bonus plan and vice versa. A commission is optimal if the agent is most difficult to motivate in the last period. Otherwise, combining the commission with a bonus plan can lower the firm’s cost of providing incentives in earlier periods. The results are robust to different types of cost externalities and demand externalities across periods. However, if the firm obtains intermediate sales information, bonus plans dominate commissions. This paper was accepted by J. Miguel Villas-Boas, marketing.
European Economic Review · 44 Zitationen · DOI
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · 32 Zitationen · DOI
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · 25 Zitationen · DOI
International Economic Review · 20 Zitationen · DOI
We analyze the effects of wage floors on optimal job design in a moral‐hazard model with asymmetric tasks and imperfect aggregate performance measurement. Due to cost advantages of specialization, assigning the tasks to different agents is efficient. A sufficiently high wage floor, however, induces the principal to dismiss one agent or to even exclude tasks from the production process. Imperfect performance measurement always lowers profit under multitasking, but may increase profit under specialization. We further show that variations in the wage floor and the agents' reservation utility have significantly different effects on welfare and optimal job design.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · 19 Zitationen · DOI
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · 19 Zitationen · DOI
We analyze the optimal combination of promotion tournaments and linear individual performance pay in an employment relationship. An agent's effort is nonobservable and he has private information about his suitability for promotion. Thus, the two incentive schemes need to be combined to serve both incentive and selection purposes. If harder working agents respond less to intensified effort incentives, we find that the principal puts less emphasis on individual performance pay when selection becomes more important. Thus, we provide a possible explanation as to why, in practice, individual performance pay is less prevalent than promotion‐based incentives.
Management Science · 18 Zitationen · DOI
We investigate a situation where a firm employing a sales agent faces moral hazard with respect to prospecting effort and the threat of collusion between agent and customer. We show that the firm should offer more pricing authority to the agent the more severe the moral hazard problem, although doing so further expands the agent’s discretion. Nevertheless, restricting the agent’s pricing authority such that he cannot sell to low-valuation customers is typically optimal to prevent collusion. We derive optimal collusion-proof contracts, describe conditions under which collusion arises in equilibrium, and study the optimal interaction between delegation, incentive pay, and the firm’s installed auditing technology. This paper was accepted by Juanjuan Zhang, marketing.
Economics Letters · 15 Zitationen · DOI
German Economic Review · 15 Zitationen · DOI
Abstract We analyze a situation where a principal wants to induce two firms to produce an output, for example electricity from renewable energy sources. Firms can undertake non-contractible investments to reduce production cost of the output. Part of these investments spills over and also reduces production cost of the other firm. Comparing a general price subsidy and an innovation tournament, we find that the principal’s expected cost of implementing a given expected output is always higher under the tournament, even though this scheme may lead to more innovation.
The Leadership Quarterly · 8 Zitationen · DOI
Management Accounting Research · 6 Zitationen · DOI
Southern Economic Journal · 6 Zitationen · DOI
Trade liberalization under GATT/World Trade Organization (WTO) has been partly offset by an increase in antidumping protection, possibly due to the inclusion of sales below cost in the definition of dumping. This article investigates the domestic government's antidumping duty choice in an asymmetric information framework, in which the foreign firm's cost is observed by the domestic firm, but not by the government. We show that by designing a tariff schedule contingent on firms' cost reports and accompanied by a threat to collect additional information for report verification, the domestic government may not only be able to extract the true cost information, but also succeed in implementing the full‐information, governmental welfare‐maximizing duty. The antidumping framework within GATT/WTO may thus not only offer the means to pursue strategic trade policy disguised as fair trade policy, but it also helps overcome informational problems with regard to correctly determining the optimal strategic trade policy.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · 6 Zitationen · DOI
SSRN Electronic Journal · 5 Zitationen · DOI
SSRN Electronic Journal · 5 Zitationen · DOI
SSRN Electronic Journal · 5 Zitationen · DOI
SSRN Electronic Journal · 5 Zitationen · DOI
SSRN Electronic Journal · 5 Zitationen · DOI
SSRN Electronic Journal · 4 Zitationen · DOI
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · 2 Zitationen · DOI
We analyze the optimal combination of promotion tournaments and individual performance pay in an employment relationship. An agent's effort is non-observable and he has private information about his suitability for promotion. We find that the principal does not provide individual incentives if it is sufficiently important to promote the most suitable candidate. Thus, we give a possible explanation for why individual performance schemes are less often observed in practice than predicted by theory. Furthermore, optimally trading off incentive and selection issues causes a form of the Peter Principle: The less suitable agent has an inefficiently high probability of promotion.
SSRN Electronic Journal · 2 Zitationen · DOI
Kooperationen3
Bestätigte Forscher↔Partner-Paare aus HU-FIS — Gold-Standard-Positive für das Matching.
SFB/TRR 266/2: Transparenzwirkungen von Organisationsinnovationen (TP A02)
university
SFB 190/2: Anreize, Unternehmensführung und Arbeitsorganisation (TP B05)
university
SFB-TRR 266/1: Transparenzwirkungen von Organisationsinnovationen (TP A02)
university
Stammdaten
Identität, Organisation und Kontakt aus HU-FIS.
- Name
- Prof. Dr. Anja Schöttner
- Titel
- Prof. Dr.
- Fakultät
- Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
- Institut
- Management
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- 26.4.2026, 01:12:12