Dr. Richard Moore erforscht, wie Menschen Wissen durch Kommunikation und Zeugenaussagen erwerben und bewerten — insbesondere, wie wir lernen, Informationen von anderen kritisch zu hinterfragen und Fehler in unserem Denken zu vermeiden. Sein Fokus liegt auf den kognitiven Mechanismen der 'epistemischen Wachsamkeit': Wie erkennen wir zuverlässige von unzuverlässigen Quellen? Das hat praktische Relevanz für Bildung, Unternehmenskommunikation und öffentliche Debatten, wo Vertrauen in Informationen entscheidend ist. Moore verbindet dabei kognitionswissenschaftliche und philosophische Perspektiven, um zu verstehen, wie Argumentation und soziales Lernen funktionieren.
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Dr. Richard Moore
HU-FIS-Profil ↗Humans are reliant upon testimony for much of what we know (Goldberg 2010). However, for cultural knowledge to be reliable, what we learn from others must also be evaluated – and without ‘epistemic vigilance’ we are liable to lapse into systematic reasoning errors (Evans & Over 1997). The cognitive mechanisms that we use for this are partly innate (Sperber et al. 2010), but reasoning skills are also learned (Luria 1976). While even young children show discrimination in evaluating what others tell them (Harris 2012; Stoeber, Moore & Tomasello, submitted), we are not always good at assessing the truth of what we are told. The possible influence of ‘fake news’ in the recent US presidential election, and the successful use of propaganda and inflammatory rhetoric in elections on both sides of the Atlantic testifies to the ways in which our reasoning and judgement can be led astray. This interdisciplinary (Philosophy and Psychology) two-day conference, to be hosted by the Berlin School of Mind and Brain at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, will consider the cognitive science of testimony, reasoning, and social learning. The first day of talks will be devoted to discussions of the role of dialogue and social learning in the development of human reasoning. One the second day, we will discuss the nature of the biases that influence our learning from testimony, the ways in which our epistemic dependence on others makes us vulnerable to exploitation, and the ways in which this vulnerability might be resisted.
Biological reviews/Biological reviews of the Cambridge Philosophical Society · DOI
Language's intentional nature has been highlighted as a crucial feature distinguishing it from other communication systems. Specifically, language is often thought to depend on highly structured intentional action and mutual mindreading by a communicator and recipient. Whilst similar abilities in animals can shed light on the evolution of intentionality, they remain challenging to detect unambiguously. We revisit animal intentional communication and suggest that progress in identifying analogous capacities has been complicated by (i) the assumption that intentional (that is, voluntary) production of communicative acts requires mental-state attribution, and (ii) variation in approaches investigating communication across sensory modalities. To move forward, we argue that a framework fusing research across modalities and species is required. We structure intentional communication into a series of requirements, each of which can be operationalised, investigated empirically, and must be met for purposive, intentionally communicative acts to be demonstrated. Our unified approach helps elucidate the distribution of animal intentional communication and subsequently serves to clarify what is meant by attributions of intentional communication in animals and humans.
Animal Cognition · DOI
Philosophy Compass · DOI
Abstract Humans alone acquire language. According to one influential school of thought, we do this because we possess a uniquely human ability to act with and attribute “Gricean” communicative intentions. A challenge for this view is that attributing communicative intent seems to require cognitive abilities that infant language learners lack. After considering a range of responses to this challenge, I argue that infant language development can be explained, because Gricean communication is cognitively less demanding than many suppose. However, a consequence of this is that abilities for Gricean communication are unlikely to be uniquely human.