Prof. Dr. Sarah Eaton

Prof. Eaton erforscht derzeit, wie China in der globalen Standardisierung technischer Normen Einfluss gewinnt und dabei etablierte Regeln des Westens herausfordert – ein Projekt, das von der EU mit einem ERC Consolidator Grant gefördert wird. Parallel untersucht sie, wie sich China durch staatliche Kapitalismus-Modelle wirtschaftlich anpasst und wie lokale chinesische Regierungen zunehmend kooperieren, statt nur zu konkurrieren. Ihre Arbeiten verbinden dabei Fragen von Macht, Governance und internationaler Wirtschaftspolitik: Wie beeinflussen autoritäre Staaten globale Regeln, und wie legitimieren sie ihre Wirtschaftspolitik gegenüber der Bevölkerung? Für Unternehmen und Behörden relevant ist dies bei der Teilhabe an technischen Standardisierungsprozessen, bei Geschäftsbeziehungen zu China und beim Verständnis von Governance-Modellen in Schwellenländern.

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• Interjurisdiktionaler Wettbewerb und Kooperation in China: Eine Analyse von Ursachen und politischen Maßnahmen auf der Kreisebene

  Quelle ↗

  Förderer: DFG Sachbeihilfe Zeitraum: 02/2020 - 01/2023 Projektleitung: Prof. Dr. Sarah Eaton

• The emergence of the environmental state under authoritarianism: new models of socio-environmental bargaining and fringe area governance in Asia (China, Vietnam and beyond)

  Quelle ↗

  Förderer: Öffentliche Förderorganisationen anderer Länder Zeitraum: 04/2020 - 07/2023 Projektleitung: Prof. Dr. Sarah Eaton

• BCCN: Establishing a digital platform for China knowledge exchange - fostering teaching and research collaborations

  Quelle ↗

  Förderer: Berlin University Alliance (BUA) Zeitraum: 07/2022 - 06/2023 Projektleitung: Prof. Dr. Sarah Eaton

• Authoritarian Environmentalism Undermined? Local Leaders’ Time Horizons and Environmental Policy Implementation in China

  2014

  The China Quarterly · DOI

  Abstract China's national leaders see restructuring and diversification away from resource-based, energy intensive industries as central goals in the coming years. On the basis of extensive fieldwork in China between 2010 and 2012, we suggest that the high turnover of leading cadres at the local level may hinder state-led greening growth initiatives. Frequent cadre turnover is intended primarily to keep local Party secretaries and mayors on the move in order to promote the implementation of central directives. While rotation does seem to aid implementation by reducing coordination problems, there are also significant downsides to local leaders changing office every three to four years. Officials with short time horizons are likely to choose the path of least resistance in selecting quick, low-quality approaches to the implementation of environmental policies. We conclude that the perverse effects of local officials’ short time horizons give reason to doubt the more optimistic claims about the advantages of China's model of environmental authoritarianism.

• Central Protectionism in China: The “Central SOE Problem” in Environmental Governance

  2017

  The China Quarterly · DOI

  Abstract This article examines the so-called “central State Owned Enterprise (SOE) problem” in China's environmental governance system, namely central SOEs' defiance of environmental regulation. We present evidence showing that, in the last decade, central SOEs have been the source of a large number of serious pollution incidents and have often failed to comply with environmental guidelines and regulations. Central SOEs in the electricity generation and oil and gas industries are particularly culpable, with six firms alone accounting for 62 per cent of all 2,370 reported violations (2004–2016). We argue that a combination of “central protectionism” of state-owned national champions and insufficient regulatory capacity in the environmental bureaucracy have provided state firms under central management with both incentives and opportunities to shirk on environmental regulations. Yet, while the institutions of central protectionism are deeply rooted, countervailing forces within the complex Chinese state are also gaining momentum. In spite of the considerable regulatory challenges, officials in the environment bureaucracy display increasing resolve and ingenuity in trying to strengthen their enforcement capacity.