Prof. Dr. Dirk Engelmann

Profil

• Einstein Visiting Fellowship Bertil Tungodden: Fairness, freedom, and inequality acceptance -- A new approach to the study of distributional preferences.

  Quelle ↗

  Förderer: Einstein Visiting Fellow Zeitraum: 07/2022 - 06/2024 Projektleitung: Prof. Georg Weizsäcker, Ph. D.

• SFB/TRR 190/1: Heterogenität von Erwartungen und Präferenzen und ihr kombinierter Einfluss auf individuelle Entscheidungen (TP A01)

  Quelle ↗

  Förderer: DFG Sonderforschungsbereich Zeitraum: 01/2017 - 12/2020 Projektleitung: Prof. Dr. Dirk Engelmann

• SFB/TRR 190 /2: Heterogenität von Erwartungen und Entscheidungsverzerrungen (TP A01)

  Quelle ↗

  Förderer: DFG Sonderforschungsbereich Zeitraum: 01/2021 - 12/2024 Projektleitung: Prof. Dr. Dirk Engelmann

• SFB/TRR 190/3: Heterogenität von Erwartungen und Entscheidungsverzerrungen (TP A01)

  Quelle ↗

  Förderer: DFG Sonderforschungsbereich Zeitraum: 01/2025 - 12/2028 Projektleitung: Prof. Dr. Dirk Engelmann

• Schul-Umwelt-Zentrum Berlin Mitte

  P

  41 Treffer60.3%
  • Gamification for Climate Action
    P

    60.3%

• SoftBank Robotics

  P

  23 Treffer59.2%
  • Embodied Audition for RobotS
    P

    59.2%

• RISC Software GmbH

  P

  25 Treffer58.4%
  • EU: Scattering Amplitudes: From Geometry to EXperiment (SAGEX)
    P

    58.4%

• Magwel NV

  P

  18 Treffer56.0%
  • EU: Simulation in Multiscale Physical and Biological Systems (STIMULATE)
    P

    56.0%

• NVIDIA GmbH

  P

  18 Treffer56.0%
  • EU: Simulation in Multiscale Physical and Biological Systems (STIMULATE)
    P

    56.0%

• International Business Machines Corporation Research GmbH

  P

  21 Treffer56.0%
  • EU: Simulation in Multiscale Physical and Biological Systems (STIMULATE)
    P

    56.0%
  • EU: Bottom-Up Generation of atomicalLy Precise syntheTIc 2D MATerials for High Performance in Energy and Electronic Applications – A Multi-Site Innovative Training Action (ULTIMATE)
    P

    53.4%

• Berliner Senatsverwaltung für Bildung, Jugend und Familie

  PT

  46 Treffer54.8%
  • Begleitforschung zum Berliner Schulversuch Hybridunterricht
    P

    54.8%

• Bernstein Center for Computational Neuroscience Berlin

  PT

  13 Treffer54.4%
  • SFB 1315/2: Mechanismen und Störungen der Gedächtniskonsolidierung: Von Synapsen zur Systemebene
    P

    54.4%

• Science & Startups Berlin

  PT

  10 Treffer53.5%
  • Zuwendung im Rahmen des Programms „exist – Existenzgründungen aus der Wissenschaft“ aus dem Bundeshaushalt, Einzelplan 09, Kapitel 02, Titel 68607, Haushaltsjahr 2026, sowie aus Mitteln des Europäischen Strukturfonds (hier Euro-päischer Sozialfonds Plus – ESF Plus) Förderperiode 2021-2027 – Kofinanzierung für das Vorhaben: „exist Women“
    T

    53.5%

• Istituto Italiano di Tecnologia

  P

  4 Treffer53.4%
  • EU: Bottom-Up Generation of atomicalLy Precise syntheTIc 2D MATerials for High Performance in Energy and Electronic Applications – A Multi-Site Innovative Training Action (ULTIMATE)
    P

    53.4%

• Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments

  2004

  American Economic Review · 1229 Zitationen · DOI

  We present simple one-shot distribution experiments comparing the relative importance of efficiency concerns, maximin preferences, and inequality aversion, as well as the relative performance of the fairness theories by Gary E Bolton and Axel Ockenfels and by Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt. While the Fehr-Schmidt theory performs better in a direct comparison, this appears to be due to being in line with maximin preferences. More importantly, we find that a combination of efficiency concerns, maximin preferences, and selfishness can rationalize most of the data while the Bolton-Ockenfels and Fehr-Schmidt theories are unable to explain important patterns.

• Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game

  2009

  Games and Economic Behavior · 253 Zitationen · DOI

• An experimental study of the repeated trust game with incomplete information

  2002

  Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · 157 Zitationen · DOI

• A Within-Subject Analysis of Other-Regarding Preferences

  2010

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 143 Zitationen · DOI

• Altruistic punishment and the threat of feuds

  2011

  Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · 114 Zitationen · DOI

• Reconsidering the Effect of Market Experience on the ''Endowment Effect''

  2010

  Econometrica · 101 Zitationen · DOI

  Simple exchange experiments have revealed that participants trade their endowment less frequently than standard demand theory would predict. List (2003a) found that the most experienced dealers acting in a well functioning market are not subject to this exchange asymmetry, suggesting that a significant amount of market experience is required to overcome it. To understand this market-experience effect, we introduce a distinction between two types of uncertainty—choice uncertainty and trade uncertainty—both of which could lead to exchange asymmetry. We conjecture that trade uncertainty is most important for exchange asymmetry. To test this conjecture, we design an experiment where the two treatments impact differently on trade uncertainty, while controlling for choice uncertainty. Supporting our conjecture, we find that “forcing” subjects to give away their endowment in a series of exchanges eliminates exchange asymmetry in a subsequent test. We discuss why markets might not provide sufficient incentives for learning to overcome exchange asymmetry.

• Belief Elicitation in Experiments: Is There a Hedging Problem?

  2010

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 92 Zitationen · DOI

• The false consensus effect disappears if representative information and monetary incentives are given

  2000

  Experimental Economics · 90 Zitationen · DOI

• To Buy or Not to Buy? An Experimental Study of Consumer Boycotts in Retail Markets

  2005

  Economica · 83 Zitationen · DOI

  We investigate experimentally how firms and consumers react to a sudden cost increase in a competitive retail market. We compare two conditions that exclusively differ with respect to how difficult it is to organize and enforce boycotts. We find that cost increases translate into sudden price increases, and that consumer boycotts are frequent in response. However, consumer boycotts are unsuccessful in holding down market prices even if collective action problems are completely eliminated. While consumer boycotts do not increase consumer rent, they reduce market efficiency. Consumer boycotts apparently serve to punish firms for seemingly unfair price increases.

• Bidding Behaviour in Multi‐Unit Auctions – an Experimental Investigation

  2009

  The Economic Journal · 70 Zitationen · DOI

  We present laboratory experiments of five different multi-unit auction mechanisms. Two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned off among two bidders with flat demand for two units. We test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. We also test revenue equivalence for these auctions as well as for the Ausubel, the Vickrey and the discriminatory sealed-bid auction. Furthermore, we compare the five mechanisms with respect to the efficient allocation of the units. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009.

• Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game

  2003

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 66 Zitationen · DOI

• Deconstruction and reconstruction of an anomaly

  2012

  Games and Economic Behavior · 58 Zitationen · DOI

• Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments: Reply

  2006

  American Economic Review · 53 Zitationen · DOI

  Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments: Reply by Dirk Engelmann and Martin Strobel. Published in volume 96, issue 5, pages 1918-1923 of American Economic Review, December 2006

• Maximum effort in the minimum-effort game

  2010

  Experimental Economics · 50 Zitationen · DOI

  Abstract We report results from standard minimum-effort experiments conducted in Copenhagen (Denmark). Our subjects frequently coordinate on the Pareto-efficient equilibrium even in groups of six. This is in stark contrast to the previous literature, as we show in a detailed analysis of experiments which had the same design but were held in different countries. The subject-pool effect is substantiated by the finding that, the higher the share of Danish subjects in a group, the higher the minimum-effort levels. These findings suggest that the prevalent coordination failures previously observed are affected by significant subject-pool effects.

• Preferences over Income Distributions

  2007

  Public Finance Review · 46 Zitationen · DOI

  Preferences over income distribution are the basis for a variety of models that aim at explaining results in economic experiments. The direct evidence concerning these preferences, however, is limited to a relatively small set of games. The authors discuss crucial evidence, including that from a recent large-scale Internet experiment and the different models' performance. It appears that subjects are highly heterogeneous and that the relative impact of different motives depends on a variety of factors. The authors present a general model that can help as a starting point for measuring distributional preferences.

• Who Cares About Social Image?

  2018

  Open access LMU (Ludwid Maxmilian's Universitat Munchen) · 43 Zitationen · DOI

  This paper experimentally investigates how concerns for social approval relate to intrinsic motivations to purchase ethically. Participants state their willingness-to-pay for both a fair trade and a conventional chocolate bar in private or publicly. A standard model of social image predicts that all participants increase their fair trade premium when facing an audience. We find that the premium is indeed higher in public than in private. This effect, however, is driven by participants who preferred a conventional chocolate bar over a fair trade one in a pre-lab choice. For those who chose the fair trade chocolate bar, public exposure does not change the fair trade premium. This is captured by a generalized model where intrinsic preferences and the concern for social approval are negatively correlated.

• Tax Liability-Side Equivalence in Experimental Posted-Offer Markets

  2002

  Southern Economic Journal · 37 Zitationen · DOI

  In theory, the incidence of a tax should be independent of which side of the market it is levied on. This principle of liability side equivalence underlies virtually all theories of tax incidence. Policy discussions, however, tend to place great emphasis on the legal division of tax payments. We use computerized experimental posted–offer markets to test liability side equivalence. We find that market outcomes are essentially the same when the tax is levied on sellers as when it is levied on buyers. Prices in both treatments are slightly above the competitive equilibrium. Thus we cannot reject liability side equivalence

• The Robustness of Laboratory Gift Exchange: A Reconsideration ¤

  2002

  Royal Holloway Digital Repository (University of London) · 34 Zitationen

  We report a gift exchange experiment in which we systematically vary the following experimental design and implementation characteristics: the choice of equilibrium (interior versus corner point), the extent of potential efficiency gains, and the choice of frames (abstract versus employer worker). We also employ a matching mechanism that had been shown to best preserve the nature of one-shot interactions (rotation).<br />\n Much of the observed play of our participants, especially responders, is at or close to equilibrium. Our results therefore stand in stark contrast to much of what has been reported in literature. Specifically, we find little evidence for positive reciprocity but substantial evidence for negative reciprocity.<br />\n Our results suggest that laboratory gift exchange is highly sensitive to the parameterization of the model and implementation characteristics and question the common belief that trust and reciprocity are robust phenomena.

• How not to extend models of inequality aversion

  2011

  Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · 32 Zitationen · DOI

• BIDDING BEHAVIOR IN MULTI-UNIT AUCTIONS — AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION AND SOME THEORETICAL INSIGHTS*

  2003

  RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · 32 Zitationen

  Laboratory experiments of five different multi-unit auction mechanisms are presented. Two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned off among two bidders with demand for two units. It is tested whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. Revenue equivalence is tested for these auctions as well as for the Ausubel, the Vickrey and the discriminatory sealed-bid auction. It is compared five mechanisms with respect to the efficient allocation of the units. There are also provided some theoretical insights concerning the equilibria of uniform-price auctions with incomplete information.

• Mechanisms for Efficient Voting with Private Information about Preferences

  2012

  The Economic Journal · 29 Zitationen · DOI

  In games of conflict, players typically have an incentive to exaggerate their interests. This concerns issues ranging from negotiations between political parties to conflict resolution within marriages. We experimentally study this problem using a simple voting game where information about preferences is private. With random matching, subjects overwhelmingly follow the dominant strategy to exaggerate their preferences. The exogenous linking mechanism by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) captures nearly all achievable efficiency gains. Repeated interaction in various settings, which could allow endogenous linking mechanisms to evolve, leads to significant gains in truthful representation and efficiency only when players can choose their partners.

• Collusion through price ceilings? In search of a focal-point effect

  2011

  Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · 27 Zitationen · DOI

• Preferences and Beliefs in a Sequential Social Dilemma: A Within-Subjects Analysis

  2009

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 27 Zitationen · DOI

• In the long-run we are all dead: on the benefits of peer punishment in rich environments

  2015

  Social Choice and Welfare · 25 Zitationen · DOI

• To Buy or Not to Buy? An Experimental Study of Consumer Boycotts in Retail Markets

  2002

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 22 Zitationen · DOI

• Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

  SFB/TRR 190/1: Heterogenität von Erwartungen und Präferenzen und ihr kombinierter Einfluss auf individuelle Entscheidungen (TP A01)

  university

• Norwegian School of Economics

  Einstein Visiting Fellowship Bertil Tungodden: Fairness, freedom, and inequality acceptance -- A new approach to the study of distributional preferences.

  other

Name

Prof. Dr. Dirk Engelmann

Titel

Prof. Dr.

Fakultät

Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät

Institut

Finanzwissenschaft

Telefon

+49 30 2093-99456

HU-FIS-Profil

Quelle ↗

Zuletzt gescrapt

26.4.2026, 01:04:23