Prof. Dr. Jonas Radbruch
Profil
Forschungsthemen1
SFB/TRR 190/3: Ausbildungsentscheidungen, Marktdesign und Bildungsergebnisse (TP A06)
Quelle ↗Förderer: DFG Sonderforschungsbereich Zeitraum: 01/2025 - 12/2028 Projektleitung: Prof. Dr. Jonas Radbruch
Mögliche Industrie-Partner10
Stand: 26.4.2026, 19:48:44 (Top-K=20, Min-Cosine=0.4)
- 25 Treffer60.4%
- DFG-Sachbeihilfe: Aufmerksamkeit und sensorische Integration im aktiven Sehen von bewegten ObjektenP60.4%
- SFB 1315/2: Mechanismen und Störungen der Gedächtniskonsolidierung: Von Synapsen zur SystemebeneP54.9%
- DFG-Sachbeihilfe: Aufmerksamkeit und sensorische Integration im aktiven Sehen von bewegten Objekten
- 19 Treffer56.6%
- Gamification for Climate ActionP56.6%
- Gamification for Climate Action
- 14 Treffer54.7%
- Design & Implementierung eines neuronalen Netzwerks für die Personendetektion (Transferbonus)P54.7%
- Design & Implementierung eines neuronalen Netzwerks für die Personendetektion (Transferbonus)
- 11 Treffer54.7%
- The Pathway to Inquiry Based Science TeachingP54.7%
- The Pathway to Inquiry Based Science Teaching
- 11 Treffer54.7%
- The Pathway to Inquiry Based Science TeachingP54.7%
- The Pathway to Inquiry Based Science Teaching
- 11 Treffer54.7%
- The Pathway to Inquiry Based Science TeachingP54.7%
- The Pathway to Inquiry Based Science Teaching
- 11 Treffer54.7%
- The Pathway to Inquiry Based Science TeachingP54.7%
- The Pathway to Inquiry Based Science Teaching
- 11 Treffer54.7%
- The Pathway to Inquiry Based Science TeachingP54.7%
- The Pathway to Inquiry Based Science Teaching
- 13 Treffer54.5%
- Modellierung und Transfer von Inhalts- und Qualitätskriterien für die Programmplanung in der finanziellen Bildung im ErwachsenenalterP54.5%
- Modellierung und Transfer von Inhalts- und Qualitätskriterien für die Programmplanung in der finanziellen Bildung im Erwachsenenalter
- Modellierung und Transfer von Inhalts- und Qualitätskriterien für die Programmplanung in der finanziellen Bildung im ErwachsenenalterP54.5%
- Modellierung und Transfer von Inhalts- und Qualitätskriterien für die Programmplanung in der finanziellen Bildung im Erwachsenenalter
Publikationen25
Top 25 nach Zitationen — Quelle: OpenAlex (BAAI/bge-m3 embedded für Matching).
The Review of Economic Studies · 42 Zitationen · DOI
Abstract This article investigates how incentives and behavioural policy interventions affect individuals’ allocation of scarce cognitive resources. Based on experimental evidence, we demonstrate that incentives systematically influence individuals’ allocation of cognitive resources, and their propensity to actively engage with a decision or to stay passive. Policies that steer individuals’ attention to a specific decision lead to more active decision-making and better choices in the targeted choice domain, but induce negative cognitive spillovers on the quality of choices in other domains. In our setting, these two countervailing effects offset each other, such that the overall payoff consequences of the interventions are essentially zero. We further document that cognitive spillovers are especially pronounced for complex choices and for subgroups of the population with a smaller stock of cognitive resources. We discuss implications for the design and evaluation of behavioural policy interventions.
Management Science · 38 Zitationen · DOI
Agents’ decisions to exert effort depend on the incentives and the potential costs involved. So far, most of the attention has been on the incentive side. However, our laboratory experiments underline that both the incentive and the cost side can be used separately to shape work performance. In our experiment, subjects work on a real-effort slider task. Between treatments, we vary the incentive scheme used for compensating workers. Additionally, by varying the available outside options, we explore the role of implicit costs of effort in determining workers’ performance. We observe that incentive contracts and implicit costs interact in a nontrivial manner. In general, performance decreases as implicit costs increase. Yet the magnitude of the reaction differs across incentive schemes and across the offered outside options, which, in turn, alters estimated output elasticities. In addition, comparisons between incentive schemes crucially depend on the implicit costs. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, decision analysis.
The Review of Economic Studies · 4 Zitationen · DOI
Abstract Interviewing is a decisive stage of most processes that match candidates to firms and organizations. This article studies how and why a candidate’s interview outcome depends on the other candidates interviewed by the same evaluator. We use large-scale data from high-stakes admission and hiring processes, where candidates are quasi-randomly assigned to evaluators and time slots. We find that the individual assessment decreases as the quality of other candidates assigned to the same evaluator increases. The influence of the previous candidate stands out, leading to a negative autocorrelation in evaluators’ votes of up to 40% and distorting final admission and hiring decisions. Our findings are in line with a contrast effect model where evaluators form a benchmark through associative recall. We assess potential changes in the design of interview processes to mitigate contrasting against the previous candidate.
AEA Randomized Controlled Trials · 4 Zitationen · DOI
SSRN Electronic Journal · 3 Zitationen · DOI
SSRN Electronic Journal · 3 Zitationen · DOI
SSRN Electronic Journal · 3 Zitationen · DOI
SSRN Electronic Journal · 3 Zitationen · DOI
SSRN Electronic Journal · 2 Zitationen · DOI
2 Zitationen · DOI
Abstract We experimentally study strategic procrastination in a dynamic team environment. Two team members work for a finite number of periods on a joint project. The project’s success probability depends on the effort provided by both group members. Payment is conditional on finishing the project successfully. Between treatments, we vary whether both agents are free to choose their effort level or only a single agent can do so. If only one agent can choose effort, the effort of the other member is exogenously fixed; either to providing effort only shortly before the deadline or to providing effort in all periods. While in the former case we observe some effort patterns that resemble rational procrastination, the results from the other two treatments suggest that this seems to be caused by other-regarding concerns rather than being due to the strategic motives inherent in the mechanics of rational procrastination models.
Management Science · 1 Zitationen · DOI
This paper studies how the presence of peers and different peer assignment rules—self-selection versus random assignment—affect individual performance. Using a framed field experiment, we find that the presence of a randomly assigned peer improves performance by 28% of a standard deviation (SD), whereas self-selecting peers induces an additional 15%–18% SD improvement in performance. Our results document peer effects in multiple characteristics and show that self-selection changes these characteristics. However, a decomposition reveals that variations in the peer composition contribute only little to the performance differences across peer assignment rules. Rather, we find that self-selection has a direct effect on performance. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, decision analysis. Funding: Funding by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) through CRC TR 224 (projects A01 and A02) is gratefully acknowledged. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4267 .
AEA Randomized Controlled Trials · 1 Zitationen · DOI
SSRN Electronic Journal · 1 Zitationen · DOI
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · DOI
This paper investigates how the self-selection of tasks affects worker performance. Specifically, it investigates the impact of aligning tasks with workers’ preferences and the effect of providing workers with greater autonomy in choosing their tasks. To answer these questions, we conducted an online experiment in which participants engaged in one of two real-effort tasks. We exogenously varied whether participants were either randomly assigned their preferred or non-preferred task, or if they had the opportunity to actively self-select their task. The results show that participants who were randomly assigned their preferred task or self-selected a task increased their output by about 25%–42% of a standard deviation compared to those who were assigned their non-preferred task. This increase in output is linked to both enhanced productivity and extended time spent working on the task. In essence, our results underscore that workers’ performance depends crucially on whether they work on their preferred task. Importantly, our results also document that granting workers decision autonomy in task selection reinforces the performance increase. • Real-effort experiment on how task-allocation procedures affect performance. • Tasks are either randomly assigned, or self-selected. • Performance increases if subjects work on preferred vs. non-preferred task. • Performance increases if subjects self-select vs. get assigned preferred task.
AEA Randomized Controlled Trials · DOI
AEA Randomized Controlled Trials · DOI
AEA Randomized Controlled Trials · DOI
Research Square · DOI
Abstract Altruistic cooperation has enabled humans to thrive 1 . However, the interaction of sentient individuals faces the dilemma of limiting the downsides of personally beneficial, but globally detrimental selfish behavior without causing even more damage through escalating conflicts. The evolution of cooperation has been studied in non-zero sum games, with the Prisoner’s Dilemma , “the E. coli of social psychology” 2 , providing a fundamental test case. Typically 3-12 , interactions between individuals may (i) occur repeatedly, (ii) involve groups of individuals, (iii) be subject to evolutionary mechanisms, often based on the study of equilibria for homogeneous settings. 13 However, a better understanding of the non-equilibrium dynamics of cooperation in structured environments is crucial for further progress. Here we consider an inhomogeneous, spatial, dynamic setting, in which evolution occurs not necessarily at an equilibrium. We demonstrate how minimal, publicly observable information on previous behavior can be exploited to outperform alternatives, achieving evolutionary performance similar to clandestine, membership-based strategies. We also show how polarization (with a cooperating population disintegrating into competing factions) and tribalism (with cooperation solely based on group membership instead of behavior) can arise, how these phenomena can be overcome with two additional mechanisms, and how cooperation can erode. Our results demonstrate how cooperation, reputation, polarization and tribalism are intricately linked, even in a simple mathematical model in which they arise in absence of complex psychological mechanisms. This provides a fundamental explanation for how robust cooperation may break down when faced with eroding universality of globally recognized values and of local, direct reciprocity; it may also help to prevent behavior-based reputation systems from giving way to emergent polarization and, ultimately, purely membership-based tribalism. We also anticipate that our methods will be of critical importance for the design and implementation of artificial structures based on the interaction of many independent, self-interested virtual agents.
AEA Randomized Controlled Trials · DOI
AEA Randomized Controlled Trials · DOI
AEA Randomized Controlled Trials · DOI
AEA Randomized Controlled Trials · DOI
AEA Randomized Controlled Trials · DOI
bonndoc (University of Bonn)
This dissertation consists of four independent chapters, which all study determinants of human behavior. All chapters leverage insights from behavioral economics or methods from experimental economics. The unifying framework is that I use empirical evidence from natural, field or lab experiments, which allow a clean causal identification of different determinants of human behavior. \n<br /> \nIn chapter one (based on joint work with Sebastian J. Goerg and Sebastian Kube), I study the role of implicit effort costs for effort provision and the effectiveness of incentive schemes. Agents’ decisions to exert effort depend on the incentives and the potential costs involved. So far, most of the attention has been on the incentive side. However, our laboratory experiments underline that both the incentive and the cost side can be used separately to shape work performance. In our experiment, subjects work on a real-effort slider task. Between treatments, we vary the incentive scheme used for compensating workers. Additionally, by varying the available outside options, we explore the role of implicit costs of effort in determining workers’ performance. We observe that incentive contracts and implicit costs interact in a nontrivial manner. In general, performance decreases as implicit costs increase. Yet the magnitude of the reaction differs across incentive schemes and across the offered outside options, which, in turn, alters estimated output elasticities. In addition, comparisons between incentive schemes crucially depend on the implicit costs. \n<br /> \nIn chapter two (based on joint work with Andreas Grunewald and Steffen Altmann), I study the role of scarce cognitive resources as a source of passive behavior and the impact of choice-promoting policies for people with scarce cognitive resources. Passive behavior is ubiquitous even when facing various alternatives to choose from, people commonly fail to take decisions. This chapter provides evidence on the cognitive foundations of such "passive choices" and studies implications for policies that encourage active decision making. In an experiment designed to study passive behavior, we document three main results. First, we demonstrate that scarcity of cognitive resources leads to passive behavior. Second, policies that encourage active choice succeed in reducing passivity and improve decisions in the targeted domain. Third, however, these benefits of choice-promoting policies come at the cost of negative cognitive spillovers to other domains. \n<br /> \nIn chapter three (based on joint work with Lukas Kiessling and Sebastian Schaube), I study the impact of self-selected peers on performance. In many natural environments, carefully chosen peers influence individual behavior. Using a framed field experiment at secondary schools, we examine how self-selected peers affect performance in contrast to randomly assigned ones.We find that self-selection improves performance by approximately 15% of a standard deviation relative to randomly assigned peers. Our results document peer effects in multiple characteristics and show that self-selection changes these characteristics. However, a decomposition reveals that variations in the peer composition contribute only little to the estimated average treatment effects. Rather, we find that self-selection has a direct effect on performance. \n<br /> \nIn chapter four (based on joint work with Amelie Schiprowski), I study how the assessment of a candidate is influenced by the other candidates seen by the same interviewer. We leverage novel data on more than 9,000 interviewer assessments made within the admission process of a large study grant program. We find that a candidate's assessment decreases in the measured quality of all other candidates seen by the same interviewer. The influence of the previous candidate, however, exceeds the influence of any other candidate by a factor of about three. The additional effect of the previous candidate appears to be driven by the exaggeration of small differences between current and previous candidate quality. Moreover, it is asymmetric with respect to gender and favors male candidates who follow a female candidate.
AEA Randomized Controlled Trials · DOI
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Stammdaten
Identität, Organisation und Kontakt aus HU-FIS.
- Name
- Prof. Dr. Jonas Radbruch
- Titel
- Prof. Dr.
- Fakultät
- Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
- Institut
- Rationalität und Wettbewerb
- Telefon
- +49 30 2093-99527
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- 26.4.2026, 01:10:41