Dr. Benjamin Kiesewetter

Dr. Benjamin Kiesewetter erforscht die philosophischen Grundlagen von Normativität – also die Frage, wie wir begründen, was richtig, falsch, gut oder schlecht ist. Sein aktueller Fokus liegt auf der Struktur normativer Urteile und deren Rolle in Moral, Werttheorie und Erkenntnistheorie. Für Unternehmen und öffentliche Institutionen ist diese Arbeit relevant, wenn es um die konzeptionelle Klärung von Entscheidungskriterien, ethischen Governance-Rahmen oder die Begründung von Regelwerken geht. Seine Forschung liefert theoretische Grundlagen, um normative Fragen systematisch zu durchdenken – eine Basis für fundierte Entscheidungsfindung in komplexen Kontexten.

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• Prinzipien des deliberativen Sollens

  Quelle ↗

  Die Frage „Was soll ich tun?“ ist, nicht nur nach Meinung Kants, eine der Grundfragen der Philosophie überhaupt. Anliegen des hier vorgestellten Forschungsprojektes ist es, zu einem Verständnis dieser Frage, die hier als Kernfrage praktischer Deliberation verstanden wird, und somit zu einem Verständnis desjenigen Begriff des ‚Sollens’ beizutragen, der mit Bernard Williams als deliberativer Sollensbegriff bezeichnet werden kann. Das Ziel des Projektes besteht darin, grundlegende Prinzipien des deliberativen Sollens einer systematischen Untersuchung zu unterziehen und philosophische Konsequenzen solcher Prinzipien zu erarbeiten. Unter grundlegenden Prinzipien sind dabei, in erster Näherung, solche Prinzipien zu verstehen, die unabhängig von jeder inhaltlich substantiellen normativen Theorie Gültigkeit beanspruchen.

• The Structure of Normativity (REASONS F1RST)

  Quelle ↗

  Some of the core fields of philosophy – including moral philosophy, value theory, and epistemology – are, at their heart, concerned with normative questions: questions about what is good or bad, right or wrong, justified or unjustified. These questions concern the content of judgements that human beings are constantly making and that structure our way of thinking, feeling, and acting. But while there is wide agreement in contemporary philosophy that normative judgements form a unified and important category of human thought, philosophers still struggle to understand what normativity actually is. One highly attractive hypothesis is that normativity can be analysed in terms of reasons – i.e. in terms of the factors that count in favour of or against actions or attitudes. But the systematic exploration of this Reasons-First Approach is still lacking. REASONS F1RST aims to undertake this much-needed investigation. Fostering multidisciplinary conversations, the project will explore the Reasons-First Approach on a large scale. It seeks to address recent challenges to the Reasons-First Approach and to show that it prevails over alternative approaches to understanding normativity. REASONS F1RST thus pursues a twofold objective: (i) to assess the merits and demerits of the Reasons-First Approach compared to alternative proposals and (ii) to work out in detail how different normative phenomena – including values, obligations and rights, the justification of beliefs, as well as appropriateness norms for emotions – can be explained in terms of reasons. Building on the work of a multidisciplinary research team, REASONS F1RST aims at nothing less than a fundamental understanding of one of the most important concepts of contemporary philosophy.

• The right and the wrong kind of reasons

  2017

  Philosophy Compass · DOI

  Abstract In a number of recent philosophical debates, it has become common to distinguish between two kinds of normative reasons, often called the right kind of reasons (henceforth, RKR) and the wrong kind of reasons (henceforth, WKR). The distinction was first introduced in discussions of the so‐called buck‐passing account of value , which aims to analyze value properties in terms of reasons for pro‐attitudes and has been argued to face the wrong kind of reasons problem . But nowadays, it also gets applied in other philosophical contexts and to reasons for other responses than pro‐attitudes, for example in recent debates about evidentialism and pragmatism about reasons for belief. While there seems to be wide agreement that there is a general and uniform distinction that applies to reasons for different responses, there is little agreement about the scope, relevance, and nature of this distinction. Our aim in this article is to shed some light on this issue by surveying the RKR/WKR distinction as it has been drawn with respect to different responses, and by examining how it can be understood as a uniform distinction across different contexts. We start by considering reasons for pro‐attitudes and emotions in the context of the buck‐passing account of value (). Subsequently, we address the distinction that philosophers have drawn with respect to reasons for other attitudes, such as beliefs and intentions (), as well as with respect to reasons for action (). We discuss the similarities and differences between the ways in which philosophers have drawn the RKR/WKR distinction in these areas and offer different interpretations of the idea of a general, uniform distinction. The major upshot is that there is at least one interesting way of substantiating a general RKR/WKR distinction with respect to a broad range of attitudes as well as actions. We argue that this has important implications for the proper scope of buck‐passing accounts and the status of the wrong kind of reasons problem ().

• "Ought" and the Perspective of the Agent